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COMMUNICATION IN CYBERSPACE* 
NANCY LEONG** & JOANNE MORANDO*** 
This Article examines a persistent and pervasive problem in 
cybercrime law. What counts as “communication” on the 
Internet? Defining the term is particularly important for crimes 
such as cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and cyberbullying, 
where most statutes require a showing that the alleged perpetrator 
“communicated” with the victim or impose a similar requirement 
using slightly different language. 
This Article takes up the important task of defining 
“communication.” As a foundation to our discussion, we provide 
the first comprehensive survey of state statutes and case law 
relating to cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and cyberbullying. 
We then examine the realities of the way people use the Internet 
to develop a definition of “communication” that reflects those 
realities. That is, we aim to provide effective tools by which 
prosecutors can address wrongful conduct without punishing 
innocuous behavior or chilling speech. We conclude by 
proposing a model statute that appropriately defines 
“communication.” We recommend that state legislatures adopt 
the statute or modify existing laws to match it in pertinent part 
and demonstrate how the statute would apply in a range of 
situations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Elizabeth Long needs to stop bitching about how she almost 
killed herself and go ahead and do it.”1 This message was posted 
anonymously and broadcast over a 1.5-mile radius, reaching 
thousands of individuals who had downloaded an app called Yik 
Yak.2 During a series of events that would become known as 
“GamerGate,” Zoe Quinn was forced to leave her home, fearing for 
her safety, after her address was posted online.3 This act of revealing 
personal information and documents to the public online is called 
 
 1. Alyson Shontell, How Two Georgia Fraternity Brothers Created Yik Yak, a 
Controversial App that Became a ~$400 Million Business in 365 Days, BUS. INSIDER 
AUSTL. (Mar. 13, 2015, 1:12 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-inside-story-of-
yik-yak-2015-3 [http://perma.cc/H6G5-XPBB (dark archive)]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Alex Hern, Zoe Quinn on Gamergate: ‘We Need a Proper Discussion About 
Online Hate Mobs’, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2014/sep/12/zoe-quinn-gamergate-online-hate-mobs-depression-quest [http://perma.cc
/4S6A-SS26]. 
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“doxxing,”4 and it has become increasingly common in recent years.5 
Brianna Wu, who owns a video game company and develops video 
games, woke up to the following message posted to Twitter: “Guess 
what bitch? I now know where you live. You and Frank [her husband] 
live at [REDACTED].”6 A fake Twitter account titled “Anita Needs 
to Die” features a profile picture of Anita Sarkeesian, a feminist 
commentator, with photoshopped black eyes and a bloody nose.7 
In the past, statutes criminalizing behavior such as threats, 
stalking, and harassment generally require that the speaker 
“communicate” with the target.8 It is easy to establish that 
communication took place when the behavior takes the form of a 
phone call or letter directed at the target. But the Internet, along with 
various social media platforms and apps, has enabled other forms of 
directing abuse at targets for which “communication” cannot be 
defined simply as direct messages from one person to another. 
Understanding the ways people communicate on the Internet is 
vitally important to create effective laws that regulate harmful online 
speech and conduct. 
In this Article, we present an original empirical survey and 
analysis of two types of such laws in the federal code and all fifty 
states: cyberstalking laws that prohibit a pattern of online behavior 
that poses a “credible threat of harm,”9 and cyberharassment laws 
that prohibit online activity that torments or distresses its target.10 We 
also discuss, although we do not include in our empirical survey, 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Andrew Quodling, Doxxing, Swatting and the New Trends in Online Harassment, 
CONVERSATION (April 21, 2015, 4:11 PM), http://theconversation.com/doxxing-swatting-
and-the-new-trends-in-online-harassment-40234 [http://perma.cc/HX4J-GZDB]. 
 6. Ian Miles Cheong, Game Developer Brianna Wu Driven from Home After Death 
Threats and Doxxing, GAMERANX (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.gameranx.com/updates/id
/24642/article/game-developer-brianna-wu-driven-from-home-after-death-threats-and-
doxxing/ [http://perma.cc/X9Y7-JW96]. In almost all republications and screenshots of 
doxxing occurrences, the information at issue has been removed or redacted to avoid 
further dispersing the private information. See, e.g., id. 
 7. Although now deleted, a screen capture of the Twitter account can be found at 
Carly Smith, GamerGate: A War on Women Hiding Behind a Mask of “Ethics”, 
INDIEWIRE (Oct. 17, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://blogs.indiewire.com/womenandhollywood
/gamergate-a-war-on-women-hiding-behind-a-mask-of-ethics-20141017 [http://perma.cc
/9WAJ-XWSG]. 
 8. See, e.g., infra notes 17–24 and accompanying text (discussing the recent Elonis 
decision and whether or not the defendant communicated with the target). 
 9. See State Cyberstalking and Cyberharassment Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/cyberstalking-and-cyberharassment-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/2PRJ
-RRWQ] [hereinafter Cyberharassment Laws]. 
 10. See id. 
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cyberbullying laws that specifically target harassment and bullying 
among minors.11 These three categories of laws are related and often 
overlap, so the distinction among them is not always clear.12 More 
importantly, however, all three are intended to address essentially the 
same problem—the use of the Internet to engage in speech and 
behavior that seriously damages people’s lives. 
When we consider the behavior that these laws are designed to 
prevent, the need to define “communication” becomes clear. For 
example, a law designed to prohibit cyberharassment would be overly 
narrow if its scope were limited to emails. A harasser has many other 
ways of communicating with a target, such as through Facebook posts 
and messages, Tweets, blog posts, and blog comments.13 At the same 
time, a law designed to prohibit cyberharassment would be decidedly 
overbroad—and would violate the First Amendment—if it prohibited 
all negative speech about an individual on the Internet.14 
Our project, then, is to develop a definition of “communication” 
that will allow for the punishment of harmful speech without 
sweeping in innocuous speech or running afoul of the First 
Amendment. There are, of course, other issues that must be resolved 
in order to draft effective cyberharassment and cyberstalking 
statutes—for example, the mental state necessary for criminalization, 
the frequency and severity of harmful speech, and the effect of such 
speech on the victim.15 Defining what “communication” means in the 
online world, however, is uniquely critical for cyberharassment 
statutes because the other elements are, for the most part, well 
 
 11. See id. We did not engage in a census of state cyberbullying laws for this project, 
primarily because, in some instances, the legislative history of cyberstalking and 
cyberharassment laws indicates an intention to address the problem of cyberbullying with 
these broader laws. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1121–22 (2011). Moreover, other commentators have 
systematically examined such laws. See Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of 
Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 857–64 (2010). Our conclusions about what should count as 
communication for purposes of cyberstalking and cyberharassment statutes would, 
however, apply equally well to cyberbullying statutes, perhaps with the addition of forums 
unique to minors (for example, an intranet message board available exclusively to students 
at a particular school). 
 12. See Cyberharassment Laws, supra note 9. 
 13. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberbullying and the First Amendment, 14 FLA. 
COASTAL L. REV. 99, 105 (2012) (“Online bullying takes a variety of different forms, some 
of which bear a closer resemblance to physical bullying than others.”). 
 14. See King, supra note 11, at 848 (“[W]e must be cautious not to erode the freedom 
of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.”); see also Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of L.A. 
v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575, 577 (holding that a regulation prohibiting “all” 
First Amendment activities was “substantially overbroad”). 
 15. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 27–28. 
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defined in other areas of criminal law and it is appropriate to use the 
same or similar standards in the cyberharassment context. 
We conclude that “communication” on the Internet should be 
defined as any online behavior—including, but not limited to, 
speech—by an individual who recklessly disregarded a reasonable 
likelihood that the target would discover it. We select this standard 
for a number of reasons. The use of a recklessness standard with 
respect to an individual’s mental state strikes a balance between a 
standard requiring actual knowledge—which would in many instances 
be very difficult for the prosecution to prove—and mere negligence—
which risks criminalizing accidental behavior.16 By defining 
communication as behavior performed with reckless disregard for the 
likelihood that the target will find out about it, we sweep in behavior 
that an individual knew the target of the behavior would discover, as 
well as behavior that an individual consciously disregarded the 
likelihood that the target would discover. 
Moreover, this approach is consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Elonis v. United States.17 Elonis 
involved a defendant who posted violent statements about his ex-wife 
on Facebook.18 The Elonis district court jury found that the 
defendant’s statements would have caused a reasonable person to 
interpret the statements as real threats, and he was convicted under 
the federal threats statute.19 The issue on appeal in Elonis was 
whether the government must prove that the perpetrator intended to 
threaten the target, or whether the prosecutor need only show that a 
reasonable target would have felt threatened and in fact felt 
threatened.20 At oral argument, the justices seemed skeptical that the 
prosecution would have to prove intent to threaten, with Justice Alito 
noting that to do so “sounds like a roadmap for threatening a spouse 
and getting away with it.”21 Justice Kagan instead suggested a 
 
 16. See, e.g., DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND 
LAWYERING STRATEGIES § 3.08(B)(2)(1) (2d ed. 2010) (“In many other countries it is 
considered inappropriate to apply the criminal law to merely negligent acts since the 
concept of moral culpability is not sufficiently invoked for people who are just careless.”). 
 17. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 18. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 
(2015). 
 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2012); Elonis, 730 F.3d at 323. 
 20. See Elonis, 730 F.3d at 323 (“This case presents the question whether the true 
threats exception to speech protection under the First Amendment requires a jury to find 
the defendant subjectively intended his statements to be understood as threats.”). 
 21. Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2014) (No. 
13-983), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-983_4f57.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/95UR-6ZYE]. 
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recklessness standard, which would be easier for the prosecution to 
prove.22 
The Court held that whether “a reasonable person would regard 
Elonis’s communications as threats” was not sufficient to establish 
intentional communication because “criminal liability generally does 
not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the 
defendant’s mental state.”23 Ultimately, however, Elonis is perhaps 
most noteworthy for what it did not decide—is recklessness sufficient 
to convict someone under the federal threats statute, or must the 
prosecution show knowledge? This shortcoming creates substantial 
confusion: the lower courts do not know which standard to apply on 
remand, and thus the Supreme Court will likely have to address the 
issue again.24 
The uncertainty left by Elonis does not directly implicate our 
purpose in this Article. Rather, it speaks to whether a perpetrator 
intends statements to threaten,25 while our concern is with whether a 
perpetrator intends or ignores the likelihood that statements will be 
discovered by the subject. We think, however—and will explain in 
more detail in the body of the Article—that a consistent recklessness 
standard strikes the right balance between the dual intent 
requirements of the intent to threaten or engage in harmful speech 
and the intent to communicate. 
Finally, a note about terminology. While our survey of state laws 
and cases examines the way that communication is defined for 
cyberharassment and cyberstalking statutes, we will use the term 
“cyberharassment” to refer collectively to both of these types of 
statutes. When we are referring only to cyberharassment statutes, and 
not to cyberstalking statutes, we will make that clear in individual 
instances. In some cases, our analysis will also apply to cyberbullying 
statutes, given that those statutes also examine what constitutes 
electronic communication. Although we did not specifically review 
 
 22. Id. at 8. 
 23. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012. 
 24. Nancy Leong, Guest Blog: Nancy Leong, The Anticlimax of Elonis v. United 
States, HAMILTON & GRIFFIN ON RTS. (June 8, 2015), http://hamilton-griffin.com/guest-
blog-nancy-leong-the-anticlimax-of-elonis-v-united-states/ [http://perma.cc/9RBY-F57M] 
(noting that the majority in Elonis stated “it [was] not necessary to consider any First 
Amendment issues”).  
 25. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004 (“Petitioner was convicted of violating this provision 
under instructions that required the jury to find that he communicated what a reasonable 
person would regard as a threat. The question is whether the statute also requires that the 
defendant be aware of the threatening nature of the communication . . . .”). 
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those statutes in our empirical survey, we note where our discussion 
extends to cyberbullying statutes as well. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the 
importance of defining “communication” on the Internet. We survey 
the relevant scholarly literature on electronic communication, noting 
that no previous work has examined in detail what it means to 
“communicate” on the Internet in light of the myriad ways of doing 
so. We then examine the realities of how people use the Internet to 
convey information to one another and explain what it should mean 
to “communicate” online, taking into account these realities. 
In Part II, we undertake an original empirical survey of statutes 
criminalizing cyberharassment, categorizing the way that 
“communication” is currently statutorily defined and judicially 
interpreted. We first survey the way “communication” is defined in 
state statutes relating to cyberharassment and develop a typology of 
such statutes. We then examine the ways that state courts have 
interpreted the meaning of “communication” according to these 
statutes. 
Finally, Part III develops an agenda for implementing a better 
definition of “communication.” We point out the defects in existing 
laws, describe how they can be ameliorated, and propose statutory 
language that legislators should use in passing new or amending old 
cyberharassment statutes. Ultimately, these proposals will yield 
cyberharassment laws that accurately reflect the way that people use 
the Internet. 
I.  WHAT QUALIFIES AS COMMUNICATION? 
This Part considers what should qualify as “communication” on 
the Internet for purposes of cyberharassment statutes. It surveys the 
existing scholarly literature, which has not examined this issue in 
great detail. It then examines the way that people use the Internet, 
taking account of existing technology in a way that neither scholars 
nor judges have thus far. Ultimately, we adopt a practical definition of 
“communication” based on the way people actually transmit and 
receive information via the Internet. 
A. A Neglected Element of Cyberharassment 
The evolution of cyberharassment law has presented many novel 
issues for legal debate, including questions of constitutionality,26 
 
 26. Considerable scholarship focuses on what is necessary to make such 
cyberharassment statutes compliant with the requirements of the First Amendment. See 
94 N.C. L. REV. 105 (2015) 
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burdens of proof,27 and the feasibility of implementation.28 While each 
of these considerations is essential to the formation of the law, we 
must still ask a foundational question: What specific conduct is the 
legislature trying to criminalize? The answer to that question lies in 
how we define “communication,” or, put differently, what it means to 
communicate online. 
Policymakers and scholars have considered two different 
approaches to defining “communication.” The first is target-centric—
it examines how the target of the communication is affected or 
 
generally Andrew B. Carrabis & Seth D. Haimovitch, Cyberbullying: Adaptation from the 
Old School Sandlot to the 21st Century World Wide Web—The Court System and 
Technology Law’s Race To Keep Pace, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 143, 145–46 (2011) 
(analyzing First Amendment concerns of Florida’s cyberbullying laws in contrast to the 
seminal cases of free speech in public schools); Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, 
How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV. 693, 700 (2012) (presenting “a 
First Amendment primer to guide law-makers”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Hostile Educational 
Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705, 705 (2012) (discussing the interaction between the 
First Amendment and a school’s ability to punish off-campus cyberbullying); King, supra 
note 11, at 848 (2010) (offering “suggestions for how cyberbullying laws can be crafted to 
address the problem of online bullying while not eroding First Amendment freedoms”).  
 27. See, e.g., Kori Clanton, We Are Not Who We Pretend To Be: ODR Alternatives to 
Online Impersonation Statutes, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 323, 340–41 (2014) 
(noting the difficulty in the plaintiff or victim having the burden of identifying a 
perpetrator that operated in anonymity); David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark 
Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 745, 745–46 (2013) (discussing Fourth Amendment implications in 
securing evidence of cybercrime); Aimee Fukuchi, Note, A Balance of Convenience: The 
Use of Burden-Shifting Devices in Criminal Cyberharassment Law, 52 B.C. L. REV. 289, 
289 (2011) (proposing burden-shifting devices because the prosecution is procedurally 
disadvantaged in proving the details of the crime that are “peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the accused”). 
 28. We note, moreover, that while many student authors have made interesting and 
relevant contributions relating to feasibility of implementation, the issue is relatively 
lacking in commentary by established academics and practitioners. See, e.g., Heather 
Benzmiller, Note, The Cyber-Samaritans: Exploring Criminal Liability for the “Innocent” 
Bystanders of Cyberbullying, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 927, 927 (2013) (discussing the need to 
criminalize the role of the bystander that escalates the cyberbullying); Cassie Cox, 
Comment, Protecting Victims of Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment, and Online 
Impersonation Through Prosecutions and Effective Laws, 54 JURIMETRICS J. 277, 277, 
286–87 (2014) (noting the difficulties in proving the required culpable mental state); 
Arthur Gaus, Comment, Trolling Attacks and the Need for New Approaches to Privacy 
Torts, 47 U. S.F. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (2012) (proposing that a tort regime be the primary 
way to deal with cyberharassment as Internet anonymity makes traditional criminal 
culpability difficult); Kate E. Schwartz, Note, Criminal Liability for Internet Culprits: The 
Need for Updated State Laws Covering the Full Spectrum of Cyber Victimization, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 407, 409–10 (2009) (noting the myriad types of cyber victimization and 
proposing a legislative scheme that anchors liability to the culprit’s intent and the harm the 
victim suffered). 
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reached by that communication.29 The second is speaker-centric—it 
examines the means or platform that the speaker uses to 
communicate.30 Yet, a clear definition of communication requires 
incorporating both approaches. 
In a target-centric discussion of cyberharassment, the focus is on 
the wide variety of ways that harassers can harm their targets.31 
Targets can be harassed directly32 or indirectly.33 Jacqueline Lipton 
notes that “cyberbullying comes in a variety of different forms, not all 
of which involve direct communications with the victim . . . . [O]ne 
key difference between victimizing an individual in the real world and 
online is that the [online] victim is not always the direct recipient of 
the threatening or harassing communications.”34 A cyberharasser can 
recruit friends or other online networks to execute an attack,35 
assuming that the content of the interaction will find its way to the 
intended target.36 The target’s personal information can be revealed 
 
 29. For example, Massachusetts requires communication directed at a person that 
“seriously alarms or annoys that person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
substantial emotional distress.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43(a)(1) (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Legis. Sess.). 
 30. For example, Ohio requires only that the speaker “post a message with purpose to 
urge or incite another.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (LEXIS through 2015 
legislation). 
 31. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 29 (2014) 
(discussing cyberharassment’s ability to affect the “ ‘victims’ professional reputations and 
careers, discourage[] on- and offline pursuits, disrupt[] both crucial and ordinary life 
choices, and cause[] physical and emotional harm”); Cox, supra note 28, at 277 (noting 
that “cyberstalkers can use a wider range of methods, from tracking victims through social 
media to impersonating targeted individuals”). 
 32. Direct harassment was an issue in the Elonis case. See United States v. Elonis, 730 
F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). Elonis posted violent statements 
about his ex-wife, including “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in 
blood and dying from all the little cuts.” Id. at 324; see also infra Section I.A.1. 
 33. Indirect cyberharassment has very little in common with real-world harassing 
activities. See Lipton, supra note 11, at 1112 (“Laws targeted at real world activities often 
do not translate well when applied to cyberspace.”). 
 34. Lipton, supra note 13, at 105. 
 35. For a discussion of the unique ways the Internet encourages harmful group-think, 
see Scott Hammack, Comment, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line 
Requires a Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 82 (2002). 
 36. One reporter described this as “crowd-sourced revenge” when her number was 
posted on Craigslist in the personals section, leading to hours of people calling her. 
Kashmir Hill, What Are the Legal Penalties for Using Craigslist To Crowd-Source 
Revenge?, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011
/09/08/what-are-the-legal-penalties-for-using-craigslist-to-crowd-source-revenge/ 
[http://perma.cc/8NEQ-HQV2]. Most infamous was the case of an ex-boyfriend posting to 
Craigslist under the guise of his ex-girlfriend seeking to play out a “rape fantasy.” Kashmir 
Hill, A Reason Not to Respond to Rape Fantasy Ads on Craigslist, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 
16, 2010, 10:12 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/02/a-reason-not-to-respond-to-rape-
94 N.C. L. REV. 105 (2015) 
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online.37 A cyberharasser can post false information under the target’s 
name.38 Some of this conduct is online behavior that leads to offline 
harassment.39 
The speaker-centric approach to defining online communication 
involves an examination of the means or platform that the speaker is 
using to engage in speech or other online behavior.40 For example, 
one scholar defines cyberharassment as speech channeled through “e-
mails, blogs, instant messenger messages, text or video messages, chat 
rooms, on-line social networks, or other websites.”41 Yet even this 
 
fantasy-ads-on-craigslist/ [http://perma.cc/7C8W-SHES]. Tragically, the ad asked for and 
attracted “a real aggressive man with no concern for women” who raped the woman. Id. 
 37. This phenomenon, known as “doxxing,” became the focus of cyberharassment 
debates following Gamergate in 2014. “[D]oxxing[] involves scouring the Internet for 
personal data (or documents, the source of the word ‘doxx’)—like a person’s name, address, 
occupation, Twitter or Facebook profile—and then publicly [posting] that information.” 
Emily Bazelon, The Online Avengers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/01/19/magazine/the-online-avengers.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/426K-Y9X4 (dark 
archive)]. In the 2014 Gamergate controversy, many outspoken female gamers, developers, 
and activists were doxxed as retaliation for their public stances on Gamergate. See Alex 
Hern, Felicia Day’s Public Details Put Online After She Described Gamergate Fears, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/23/felicia-days-
public-details-online-gamergate [http://perma.cc/D3WU-E2SV] (discussing how minutes 
after Felicia Day posted about Gamergate, her address and personal email were posted in 
the comments section to her original post). Though not relevant to our discussion here, there 
has been some interesting debate over the social utility for doxxing as a way to publicly 
shame poor behavior (or at least what the online community views as poor behavior). See 
Bazelon, supra. 
 38. Some victims are effectively forced to include a disclaimer on their resume 
explaining the negative results the employer will find should they Google their names. See 
Danielle Keats Citron, How Cyber Mobs and Trolls Have Ruined the Internet—and 
Destroyed Lives, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 19, 2014 12:56 PM), http://www.newsweek.com
/internet-and-golden-age-bully-271800 [http://perma.cc/5W4Y-QPUW] (describing one 
student’s troubling experience with cyberharassment, during which, at one point, “75 
percent of the links appearing on the first page of a search of her name were the attack 
sites and disparaging posts”). 
 39. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62 
(2009) (describing various methods of cyberharassment); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual 
Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 655–56 (2012) (noting the many ways that 
cyberharassers can reach their targets); Catherine E. Smith, Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress: An Old Arrow Targets the New Head of the Hate Hydra, 80 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (2002) (explaining one incident of how “online threats led to offline 
harassment”). 
 40. All but five states that have statutes that address cyberharassment use a target-
centric method. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 499); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5427 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.749 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-1 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.). 
 41. Bradford W. Reyns, Billy Henson & Bonnie S. Fisher, Stalking in the Twilight 
Zone: Extent of Cyberstalking Victimization and Offending Among College Students, 33 
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definition from three years ago is outdated because it does not 
include app-based technology. As technology has evolved, it is clear 
that cyberstalking laws cannot be limited to email or other “one-on-
one private forum[s]” as it once was.42 The original laws concerning 
cyberstalking and cyberharassment often drew parallels to offline 
conduct criminalized under stalking and harassment laws, and in 
some instances, drew the exact language from those statutes.43 
It is important to define “communication” as it relates to 
cyberactivity to prevent the all-too-easy comparison to real-world 
criminalized activities. Lipton notes the difficulty in analogizing some 
types of online communication to offline analogs.44 For example, one 
might argue that gathering on a social networking site, such as 
Facebook, to make fun of a cyberbullying victim is analogous to 
gossiping about the victim out of her earshot.45 But Lipton explains 
that the analogy is imperfect: “online conduct has the potential to be 
cut-and-pasted all over the Internet, so it is much more likely that a 
victim could ultimately access a transcript even when that person is 
not the intended recipient of the communications.”46 Likewise, the 
harm of online bullying is in some ways greater: “One feature of 
online communications is their tendency to become permanent viral 
records of comments about an individual.”47 As columnist Amy 
Harmon observes, the myriad forms of communication available on 
the Internet enable cyberbullies “to be both less obvious to adults and 
 
DEVIANT BEHAV. 1, 1 (2012) (citing Bradford W. Reyns, A Situational Crime Prevention 
Approach to Cyberstalking Victimization: Prevention Tactics for Internet Users and Online 
Place Managers, 12 CRIME PREVENTION & COMMUNITY SAFETY 99, 99–118 (2010)). 
 42. Joanna Lee Mishler, Comment, Cyberstalking: Can Communication via the 
Internet Constitute a Credible Threat and Should an Internet Service Provider Be Liable if It 
Does?, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 115, 118 (2000) (noting that 
cyberstalking can take place “in public forums, rather than personal e-mail” and that 
“traditional anti-stalking laws should [therefore] be modified to accommodate activity on 
the Internet”). 
 43. For example, Arizona still bases its cyberharassment statute on offline conduct by 
criminalizing electronic communication through “wire line, cable, wireless or cellular 
telephone call, a text message, an instant message or electronic mail.” See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-2916 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.). 
 44. Lipton, supra note 13, at 108. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 108–09. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015) (“Here ‘the 
crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct’ is the threatening 
nature of the communication. The mental state requirement must therefore apply to the 
fact that the communication contains a threat.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994))); see also id. at 2012 (“Put simply, the 
mental state requirement the Court approved in Hamling turns on whether a defendant 
knew the character of what was sent, not simply its contents and context.”). 
 47. Lipton, supra note 13, at 109. 
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more publicly humiliating, as gossip, put-downs, and embarrassing 
photos are circulated among a wide audience of peers with a few 
clicks.”48 
As technology evolves and becomes more pervasive, the effects 
of cyberharassment will too, and the law should grow to include these 
new forms of harassment. Laws must not be so narrowly constructed 
as to accidently exclude any potentially harassing conduct. Indeed, 
the possibilities for communication—and thus the possibilities for 
cyberharassment—via the Internet are so numerous that it is virtually 
impossible to name them all, and new apps are emerging every day.49 
Stakeholders beyond the legal academy have likewise attempted 
to list the ways in which cyberharassment occurs. The legislature and 
groups that promote particular public policies often adopt similar 
approaches. For example, the National Conference of State 
Legislatures offers one such definition: “Cyberharassment usually 
pertains to threatening or harassing email messages, instant messages, 
or to blog entries or websites dedicated solely to tormenting an 
individual.”50 A similar attempt to achieve clarity through specificity 
also emerges in the state statutes that we examine in Section II.B.2.51 
While some statutes are silent as to what “communication” means, 
many statutes (ineffectively) attempt to govern the way people 
interact online with an inclusive list of what should count as 
“communication.” 
What is missing from the literature is a focused examination of 
what we mean when we discuss “communication” on the Internet. 
While not every cyberharassment statute in existence uses the word 
“communication,” most impose a similar requirement using slightly 
different language.52 The concept of “communication” is integral to 
 
 48. Amy Harmon, Internet Gives Teenage Bullies Weapons to Wound from Afar, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A1. 
 49. See Richard Larson, 10 New Social Media Apps To Watch for 2015, SOC. MEDIA 
TODAY (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/10-new-social-media-
apps-watch-2015 [http://perma.cc/4BMT-WJSW] (“Social media and mobile [apps] are still 
growing segments in the tech world. New apps for media lovers who are on the go are 
being created all the time.”). 
 50. Cyberharassment Laws, supra note 9. Despite having been updated two months 
prior to the writing of this Article, this definition does not include apps. Yet apps are 
frequent vehicles for cyberharassment. Recall an example from the Introduction of this 
Article: when harassers told Elizabeth Long “to stop bitching about how she almost killed 
herself and go ahead and do it.” Shontell, supra note 1. The definition does not directly 
address these statements because they were posts on a community forum in an app. 
 51. See infra Section II.B.2 and Appendix. 
 52. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3 (2013) (“Any transfer of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature, transmitted in whole or in part 
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determining what conduct we find worthy of criminalization. For 
example, take someone who writes a lengthy series of disparaging and 
violent comments about another person online, but does so in a 
forum where the other person is virtually certain never to see it—say, 
in a private, unshared Google document.53 No information has been 
transmitted to the subject of the speech, and we doubt that many 
people would view the speech in question as worthy of 
criminalization. 
By focusing on communication, we capture what is wrong with 
cyberharassment, cyberstalking, and cyberbullying—that the target 
finds out about the speech and subsequently experiences fear, 
disruption, and emotional distress. These are the harms against which 
statutes that criminalize threats and other speech are designed to 
protect.54 As Justice O’Connor explained in Virginia v. Black55: “The 
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a 
prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of 
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition to 
protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence 
will occur.’ ”56 Understanding the ways that people communicate on 
the Internet, and importing that understanding into our 
cyberharassment statutes, is critical to addressing the harms caused by 
cyberharassment. 
B. Internet Interaction 
This Section develops a typology of the myriad ways that people 
communicate online and explains which categories should count as 
“communication.” We divide online communication into five 
categories based on whether and how the target of the 
communication would know of the existence of a particular instance 
of Internet behavior.57 While our specific contemporary examples—
Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, and LinkedIn—will eventually become 
 
by a wire, radio, computer, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system.”); see 
also infra Section II.B.2 and Appendix. 
 53. See Change Your Sharing Settings, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/docs
/answer/2494886?hl=en&ref_topic=4671185 [https://perma.cc/HEP5-UA7Q]. 
 54. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (noting states’ authority to 
punish threats and how certain policies function to protect against these types of harms). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
 57. We use the word “behavior” in this section to encompass both speech and other 
forms of online activity. For example, hacking into someone’s Facebook account could 
likely qualify as means of communicating with that person, but the word “speech” is 
somewhat inapt. 
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outdated as technology changes, the categories themselves are 
designed to be flexible. 
Today, technology allows people to engage in a wide variety of 
activities that include simultaneously sharing information with many 
friends, acquaintances, or other contacts; engaging with websites by 
making comments or posting original content; instant messaging; 
and professional and social networking. Additionally, various apps 
allow specialized types of communication. For example, one allows 
people to track their friends’ location,58 while another provides an 
anonymous forum for communication related to a particular 
institution of higher education.59 People communicate on the Internet 
to perform their work functions, complete their school assignments, 
keep in touch with family, meet potential romantic partners, socialize 
with new and existing acquaintances, and virtually every other 
purpose of human interaction. At the touch of a button, the Internet 
enables us to get in touch with almost anyone, anywhere on the 
planet, nearly instantaneously. 
Social networking is an increasingly popular subset of online 
interaction. Several social networking apps have reached over one 
million users in less than six months from their launch dates.60 Some 
of the top social media websites have over two-hundred million users, 
including Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Instagram.61 According to 
Facebook’s website, “People use Facebook to stay connected with 
friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to 
 
 58. Find My Friends, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/apps/find-my-friends/ [http://
perma.cc/T5CG-HJYG]; see also Jonny Evans, iOS 7: Making Find My Friends Useful and 
Less Creepy, COMPUTERWORLD (May 21, 2014, 9:13 AM), http://www.computerworld
.com/article/2476314/apple-ios/ios-7--making-find-my-friends-useful-and-less-creepy.html 
[http://perma.cc/E72V-M68K]. 
 59. YIK YAK, http://www.yikyakapp.com [http://perma.cc/XQH4-WGJQ]; see also 
Jonathan Mahler, Who Spewed That Abuse? Anonymous Yik Yak App Isn’t Telling, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/technology/popular-yik-yak-app
-confers-anonymity-and-delivers-abuse.html [http://perma.cc/7UMV-4HQC 
(dark archive)]. 
 60. Alyson Shontell, Here’s How Long It Took 15 Hot Startups To Get 1,000,000 
Users, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2012, 8:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/one-million-
users-startups-2012-1?op=1 [http://perma.cc/FD34-2E2K]. 
 61. Shea Bennett, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, Vine, Snapchat—Social 
Media Stats 2014, SOCIALTIMES (June 9, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes
/social-media-statistics-2014/499230 [http://perma.cc/A7JW-JP6A]. 
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share and express what matters to them.”62 Facebook has over 1.25 
billion monthly users.63 
On Facebook, users can be “friends,” which allows them access 
to one another’s information, pictures, and Internet posts.64 Users can 
privately message one another regardless of whether they are 
Facebook friends.65 Users can link posts to their Facebook friends by 
tagging the Facebook friend’s username, which then alerts the 
Facebook friend that someone has posted about them.66 Given the 
popularity of Facebook, we will use that website’s different 
communication options as the primary examples for each category of 
communication, though the categories are by no means limited to 
Facebook and similar websites. 
We have divided online communication into five categories: (1) 
Direct, which occurs when a speaker sends information directly to the 
target of the communication; (2) Tagging, which occurs when the 
speaker takes action to call the communication to the attention of the 
target; (3) Mutual Forum, which relies on the fact that the speaker 
and target are both users of the same online forum and thus are 
reasonably likely to see each other’s posts during routine usage of the 
forum; (4) Likely Discovery, which occurs when a speaker knows of 
or recklessly disregards a substantial likelihood that the subject will 
discover the speech; and (5) Discovery in Fact, which encompasses 
online speech or behavior by the speaker that the target did in fact 
find out about, but that does not fall into any of the first four 
categories. 
1.  Category 1: Direct 
Direct communication occurs when a speaker sends information 
directly to the target of the communication. On Facebook, a personal 
message from the speaker to another user would be in this category.67 
Other forums that use direct person-to-person communication 
 
 62. About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page
_info [http://perma.cc/LR8D-GP6L]. 
 63. Emil Protalinski, Facebook Passes 1.23 Billion Monthly Active Users, NEXT WEB 
(Jan. 29, 2014), http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2014/01/29/facebook-passes-1-23-billion-
monthly-active-users-945-million-mobile-users-757-million-daily-users/ [http://perma.cc
/ED5X-6RF3]. 
 64. See Adding Friends, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/360212094049906/ 
[http://perma.cc/8VMY-8TRL]. 
 65. Sending a Message, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/326534794098501/ 
[http://perma.cc/2FF4-JFQH] [hereinafter Sending a Message]. 
 66. See Tagging, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/366702950069221/ [http://
perma.cc/R8FV-TNNM] [hereinafter Tagging]. 
 67. See Sending a Message, supra note 65. 
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include email, personal messages on Google68 and LinkedIn,69 direct 
tweets via Twitter,70 and direct Snapchats.71  
2.  Category 2: Tagging 
Tagging communication occurs when the speaker takes action to 
call the communication to the attention of the target. A Facebook 
example within this category occurs when a user creates a public post 
and attaches the username of a Facebook friend.72 
A speaker “tags” a target by using an “@” symbol before the 
username of the target.73 When a speaker tags a target, the target 
receives an automatic notification of the communication by the 
website that the speaker tagged them either in a public post or in a 
post that is visible to the target.74 Other users can also see when a 
speaker tags a target.75 
Other forums that use this method of tagging communication 
include Instagram,76 Vine,77 Twitter,78 and LinkedIn.79 
 
 68. Contacting People Through Google+, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/plus
/answer/3547351?hl=en [http://perma.cc/YGH3-52QN] . 
 69. Communicating with LinkedIn Members, LINKEDIN, https://help.linkedin.com
/app/answers/detail/a_id/137/bid/247/pid/246 [https://perma.cc/WEJ6-4698]. 
 70. A user can tweet directly to another user by including in their message “@” 
followed by the other person’s username. For example, a tweet can be sent directly to 
President Obama (or, at least, to a staffer who is manning his Twitter account) simply by 
beginning the message with “@BarackObama.” The tweet will appear in other users’ news 
feeds if they follow both the sender and President Obama. Users who do not follow both 
parties can still find and view the tweet by performing a variety of searches, but it will not 
automatically appear in their news feeds. See Getting Started with Twitter, TWITTER, 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/215585 [http://perma.cc/7SV4-D3A6] (“Try posting a 
message mentioning a celebrity or person you admire—they often respond to fans.”). 
 71. Snapchat allows users to send photos directly to another user by using their 
phone’s contacts or by entering a username. Finding and Adding Friends, SNAPCHAT, 
https://support.snapchat.com/a/find-friends [http://perma.cc/5Y5F-DFUF]. 
 72. See Tagging, supra note 66. 
 73. How Do I Mention People, Pages or Groups in a Post or Comment?, FACEBOOK 
https://www.facebook.com/help/218027134882349 [http://perma.cc/S4KX-UQ4U] [hereinafter 
Mentioning People]. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Tagging, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/186952328121982/ [http://perma
.cc/R8LB-NMPR]. 
 77. Vine 1.1, VINE, http://blog.vine.co/post/55515209255/vine-11 [http://perma.cc/8RWP-
D6DE]. 
 78. Getting Started with Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/215585 
[http://perma.cc/7SV4-D3A6]. 
 79. Mention People and Companies in Your Updates, LINKEDIN, https://help.linkedin
.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/34936/~/mention-people-and-companies-in-your-updates---
frequently-asked-questions [http://perma.cc/WJR4-HF5W]. 
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3.  Category 3: Mutual Forum 
Mutual Forum communication does not alert the target that the 
speaker has posted information about them. Instead, it relies on the 
fact that the speaker and target are both users of the same online 
forum and are reasonably likely to see each other’s posts during 
routine usage of the forum. On Facebook, communication in this 
category occurs if the speaker and the target are Facebook friends, 
but the speaker does not tag the target of the online post.80 Because 
the speaker and the target are using the same forum (Facebook), it is 
likely that the target would see the post herself. Additionally, if the 
speaker and the target are both members of the same “Facebook 
group,” it is likely that the target would see a post the speaker made 
on that group’s page.81 And finally, on many forums—including 
Facebook—the forum will send everyone who is tagged in a post or 
has commented on that post a notification when a new comment 
appears in the thread.82 This often widens the audience for new 
comments, thus increasing the likelihood that users of the same forum 
will see each other’s posts. 
Other social networking websites that allow users to see one 
another’s posts within the forum include LinkedIn,83 Twitter,84 
Instagram,85 Vine,86 and Snapchat.87 In each of these forums, the 
target is likely to see postings about himself because the speaker and 
target are connected by their association through the social 
networking website. 
4.  Category 4: Likely Discovery 
Discovery-based communication does not require the speaker 
and the target of a particular online post to be users of the same 
forum. On Facebook, for example, the Likely Discovery category 
would include situations in which the speaker and the target are not 
Facebook friends. In such situations, Tagging communication could 
 
 80. See Tagging, supra note 66. 
 81. See Group Basics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/162866443847527/ 
[http://perma.cc/4QNH-JT9V]. 
 82. See Mentioning People, supra note 73. 
 83. See LINKEDIN, supra note 79. 
 84. See FAQs about Following, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/14019 
[https://perma.cc/UZ4F-C24G]. 
 85. See INSTAGRAM, supra note 76. 
 86. Getting Started, VINE, http://help.vine.co/about%20vine#channels [http://perma.cc
/52VU-7BFS ]. 
 87. Viewing Snaps, SNAPCHAT, https://support.snapchat.com/a/view-snaps [https://perma
.cc/8UTX-KZJR]. 
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not occur because users have to be Facebook friends in order to tag 
one another; therefore, the target could not receive an automatic alert 
from the website about the speaker’s post.88 Likewise, the speaker 
and target are not using the same forum because they are not 
Facebook friends, making Mutual Forum communication impossible. 
Nonetheless, the speaker might still know of or recklessly 
disregard a substantial likelihood that the target would discover the 
speech, enabling what we have dubbed “Likely Discovery” 
communication. For example, if the speaker and the target have 
mutual acquaintances in real life and the speaker is Facebook friends 
with many of these real-life acquaintances, then the speaker may have 
exhibited reckless disregard that the target would learn about the 
communications. Indeed, even if the target did not use Facebook at 
all, the post about the target could still fall into this category. As we 
have previously noted, Facebook automatically sends notifications to 
everyone who is tagged in or who has commented on a post when 
anyone writes a new comment—this increases the audience for a 
given comment and in some instances broadens the types of 
communication that would fall into the category of Likely 
Discovery.89 
Another example of Likely Discovery communication could 
occur if the speaker knows that the target has a Google alert on her 
own name—perhaps because the target has written a blog post about 
using Google alerts that the speaker has read—and the speaker still 
chooses to post threatening comments about the target in a forum 
that he knows a Google alert will pick up.90 
Factors that indicate that the speaker knew or recklessly 
disregarded a substantial likelihood that the target would discover the 
communication include: the speaker knew that the target uses the 
forum; the speaker knew that people close to the target use the 
forum; the speaker knew that the target has a Google or mention 
 
 88. See Mentioning People, supra note 73. 
 89. See id. (“The person, Page or group you mention may get a notification, and the 
post or comment will appear on their Timeline.”). While we use Facebook as an example, 
other forums also employ somewhat similar notification systems. For the sake of time and 
space, we will not list them all. 
 90. A Google alert sends an email notification any time that Google finds a new 
posting about any selected topic on the Internet. If someone places a Google alert on their 
name, it allows people to learn when content including their name is posted on the web. 
See Create an Alert, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/alerts [http://perma.cc/WRU8-
7FAR (dark archive)] (“Once your alert is set up, you’ll start getting emails any time we 
find new search results for your keywords.”). 
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alert on her own name;91 or the speaker could easily have learned that 
the target frequents the comments section of a public forum such as a 
public blog. The inquiry is not a mechanical one; the question is 
simply whether, taking into account all the relevant circumstances, 
the speaker knew of, or recklessly disregarded, a substantial 
likelihood that the target would find out about the communication. 
5.  Category 5: Discovery in Fact 
The Discovery in Fact category includes online speech or 
behavior by the speaker that the target did in fact find out about, but 
that does not fall into any of the first four categories. Speech in this 
category might include public comments on a website that the 
speaker has no reason to know the target reads, or posts on a social 
networking forum that the speaker has no way of knowing the target 
uses. It might include speech on the so-called “Darknet,” where many 
sites are difficult to access and do not appear with a simple Internet 
search.92 It might include speech on protected social media accounts 
to which neither the target nor any of the target’s acquaintances have 
access. That is, this category includes speech about the target that the 
speaker would not have expected the target to learn about. 
C. “Communication” 
In our view, the first four categories of speech we discuss in the 
previous section—Direct, Tagging, Mutual Forum, and Likely 
Discovery—should all qualify as communication for purposes of 
cyberharassment statutes. The first two categories are relatively 
straightforward. If a speaker sends a direct message to her target, no 
matter whether she uses email, instant messaging, Twitter direct 
messaging, and so forth, she demonstrates a desire to call the content 
of the message to the target’s attention.93 Likewise, by tagging the 
 
 91. See id. 
 92. See Dean Walsh, A Beginner’s Guide to Exploring the Darknet, HUBPAGES, 
http://electronician.hubpages.com/hub/A-Beginners-Guide-to-Exploring-the-Darknet (last 
updated Apr. 18, 2015) [http://perma.cc/SEQ7-DXBL] (“The ‘Dark Web’ or ‘Darknet’ is 
part of the Deep Web, because its contents are not accessible through search engines.”). 
 93. In Elonis, for instance, the defendant commented several times on his ex-sister-in-
law’s posts on Facebook. For example, when the sister posted: “Halloween costume 
shopping with my niece and nephew should be interesting,” Elonis commented, “Tell 
[their son] he should dress up as matricide for Halloween. I don’t know what his costume 
would entail though. Maybe [Tara Elonis’s] head on a stick?” United States v. Elonis, 730 
F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). Under our analysis, Elonis’s 
posts would clearly qualify as communication, although after the Supreme Court’s 
decision the prosecution would still need to prove an as-yet-to-be-determined mental 
state. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015) (providing that the Court would 
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target of a message, the speaker has taken affirmative steps to ensure 
that the target receives the message. In both situations, the speaker’s 
choice of medium clearly reveals a desire for the target to learn about 
the message as well as the decision to convey the message in a way 
that makes it likely that the target will in fact learn about the 
message. 
The third category—Mutual Forum Communication—should 
also qualify as “communication” for purposes of statutes criminalizing 
cyberharassment. While the speaker has not taken the same 
affirmative steps to draw the communication to the target’s attention 
as with person-to-person, or tagging communication, the choice of a 
mutual forum in itself reveals the speaker’s intent and desire for the 
target to learn of the speaker’s comments. That is: Why would a 
speaker post something on Facebook or LinkedIn—knowing that the 
target of the post also uses the same forum—unless the speaker 
wanted the target to learn about the communication? 
Likely Discovery should also qualify as communication. This is 
the most attenuated means of communication, but we believe that it is 
also culpable conduct. If the speaker knows that the target of the 
communication reads a specific blog, has a Google alert on her name, 
or has friends who will alert her to a Facebook post, then any post by 
the speaker is likely a subtle way of drawing the target’s attention to 
the communication. To exempt this category of communication would 
be to provide an easy end-run around prosecution for speakers who 
wish to torment or terrify their targets. The speaker could simply post 
in such a way that they know the target would find about it—thereby 
accomplishing the goal of disrupting the target’s life—yet could evade 
prosecution by claiming that they used a public forum. This would be 
the case regardless of whether they knew to a certainty that it was a 
forum where the target would eventually discover the 
communication. This fourth category of communication is the most 
neglected by current statutes and judicial decisions, and as a result we 
will focus many of our recommendations on the ways statutes should 
be amended to include this category. To do so is to engage in the 
 
await “a decision below” before deciding whether recklessness was a sufficient mental 
state). Ultimately, the Court did not consider whether Elonis’s statements about injuring 
patrons and employees of a local park, his estranged wife, police officers, a kindergarten 
class, and an FBI agent were in fact “communications.” Id. at 2001, 2007–09. Instead, the 
Court focused on the intent element of the cyberharassment statute. Id. at 2001, 2008 
(“This statute requires that a communication be transmitted and that the communication 
contain a threat. It does not specify that the defendant must have any mental state with 
respect to these elements.”). 
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essential task of ensuring that our statutes actually reflect the realities 
of how people communicate on the Internet. 
We do not believe that the final category of speech, Discovery In 
Fact, should fall within the ambit of cyberharassment statutes. Such 
speech occurs online but does not involve a situation in which the 
speaker disregarded a substantial likelihood that the target would 
learn of the communication. If the subject of a communication does in 
fact learn about a communication—but the author of the 
communication would not reasonably have anticipated that the 
subject would do so—it does not evince the intent to disrupt the 
subject’s life in the same manner as the other four modes of 
communication. 
If a speaker has a Tumblr,94 for example, that functions mainly as 
a diary, and the Tumblr is not well-read (it is not followed by any 
other Tumblrs, it has never received any reblogs,95 no one ever 
comments on the Tumblr, and it appears very low in Google search 
results as the result of limited activity on the page) then absent other 
circumstances, the author of the Tumblr would not expect the subject 
of a particular post to ever actually read the post. 
A more difficult scenario occurs when a speaker does not know 
that the target uses a mutual forum and the target then discovers a 
post. In that case, the court would have to determine whether the 
author recklessly disregarded the likelihood that the target would 
discover the post. Factors outside of the actual mutual forum would 
need to be considered to determine whether it was reasonable for the 
target to learn of the post. Such factors may include: (1) whether the 
target is an active user of other social networking sites; (2) whether 
the friends or family of the target are active users of social networking 
sites; (3) how often the author’s page is viewed; and (4) the target’s 
age and access to the Internet. If the speaker did not disregard the 
likelihood that the target would likely find out about the 
communication, then this discovery in fact situation would not qualify 
as communication. 
 
 94. Tumblr allows users to create their own blogs where they can post content such as 
“text, photos, quotes, links, music, and videos.” About, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com
/about [http://perma.cc/8ARH-L5ZV]. 
 95. A reblog occurs when one Tumblr posts material that has already appeared on 
another Tumblr. See Blog Customization, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/docs/en/blog
_customization [https://perma.cc/D4CV-R7PE]. Using the Tumblr interface, this can be 
accomplished at the touch of a button. See id. (“Just click on the avatar or the username of 
the blog you’re interested in . . . . Scroll through its posts, like and reblog as you 
please . . . .”). 
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If, however, the target did in fact learn about the post, and then 
experienced the disruption to his life that cyberharassment statutes 
are designed to guard against, our definition of communication would 
not result in finding criminal liability. We accept this result as an 
unfortunate byproduct of the need to balance the importance of 
effective cyberharassment statutes with the importance of not 
convicting people for engaging in speech that they did not intend to 
function as harassment, stalking, or bullying. 
II.  STATE CYBERCRIME LAW AND COMMUNICATION 
This Part examines how communication is treated within our 
current cyberharassment regime. We consider how “communication” 
is statutorily defined and judicially interpreted by presenting original 
empirical research, compiled in the Appendix.96 Specifically, we 
survey cyberharassment and cyberstalking statutes in all fifty states 
and federal law, then summarize the ways that these statutes have 
been interpreted by courts. 
A. The Emerging Problem of Cyberharassment 
Cyberharassment is a pervasive social problem. A recent poll 
found that 73% of adults have witnessed someone else being harassed 
online and 40% have personally experienced harassment.97 Twenty-
five percent of people have seen someone physically threatened 
online, and 8% have personally experienced physical threats over the 
Internet.98 Eighteen percent have witnessed someone be stalked, and 
8% had been stalked themselves.99 In total, 18% of people have been 
the targets of “more severe” forms of harassment such as “being the 
target of physical threats, harassment over a sustained period of time, 
stalking, and sexual harassment.”100 In particular, young women aged 
eighteen to twenty-four experience some of the more severe types of 
harassment at disproportionately high levels: 26% of women in that 
age range had been stalked online, and 25% had been the targets of 
 
 96. See infra Appendix. 
 97. MAEVE DUGGAN, ONLINE HARASSMENT 2 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org
/files/2014/10/PI_OnlineHarassment_72815.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6K2-282L]. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 2–3. “The U.S. Department of Justice statistics suggest that 850,000 
American adults—mostly women—are targets of cyber-stalking each year, and 40 percent 
of women have experienced dating violence delivered electronically.” Marlisse Silver 
Sweeney, What the Law Can (and Can’t) Do About Online Harassment, ATLANTIC (Nov. 
12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/what-the-law-can-and-
cant-do-about-online-harassment/382638/ [http://perma.cc/U7QW-Z2WQ]. 
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online sexual harassment.101 In addition, 6% of students aged twelve 
to eighteen reported that they had been victims of cyberbullying.102 
These statistics are matched by anecdotes that reveal the 
problematic nature of cyberharassment as well as its pervasiveness, 
especially—although not exclusively—for women. In early 2014, 
Amanda Hess chronicled the experience of a number of women on 
the Internet who had received threats of violence and other serious 
harm, including her own experience with a man on Twitter who 
threatened to decapitate her, and law enforcement’s lackluster 
response.103 Since Hess’s article, a number of other people—mostly 
women—have shared similar experiences.104 A particularly disturbing 
manifestation has emerged recently in the form of GamerGate, in 
which several prominent women in the gaming community received 
threats of death and other violence.105 Indeed, one of the authors has 
substantial experience with online harassment perpetrated by an 
anonymous individual she never met.106 As Hess and others have 
 
 101. DUGGAN, supra note 97, at 3–4. 
 102. JILL DEVOE & CHRISTINA MURPHY, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
STUDENT REPORTS OF BULLYING AND CYBER-BULLYING: RESULTS FROM THE 2009 
SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, at 
tbl.1.1 (2011), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011336.pdf [http://perma.cc/GL7R-FYMJ]. 
 103. Amanda Hess, Why Women Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, PAC. STANDARD 
(Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/health-and-behavior/women-arent-welcome-internet
-72170 [http://perma.cc/NJ7L-U73Z]. 
 104. See, e.g., Jill Filipovic, Let’s Be Real: Online Harassment Isn’t ‘Virtual’ for Women, 
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Jan. 10, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/let-
s-be-real-online-harassment-isn-t-virtual-for-women [http://perma.cc/L5U9-4THV]. 
 105. See, e.g., Jay Hathaway, What Is GamerGate, and Why? An Explainer for Non-
Geeks, GAWKER (Oct. 10, 2014, 9:20 AM), http://gawker.com/what-is-gamergate-and-
why-an-explainer-for-non-geeks-1642909080 [http://perma.cc/P9BD-V9UH]; Zoe Quinn, 5 
Things I Learned as the Internet’s Most Hated Person, CRACKED (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www
.cracked.com/blog/5-things-i-learned-as-internets-most-hated-person/ [http://perma.cc/SJ5C-
E6YV]; Nick Wingfield, Feminist Critics of Video Games Facing Threats in ‘Gamer Gate’ 
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/technology
/gamergate-women-video-game-threats-anita-sarkeesian.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc
/KD6V-RPHB (dark archive)]; Brianna Wu, No Skin Thick Enough: The Daily 
Harassment of Women in the Game Industry, POLYGON (July 22, 2014, 11:36 AM), 
http://www.polygon.com/2014/7/22/5926193/women-gaming-harassment [http://perma.cc
/LT2S-PC4B]; Brianna Wu, Why Gamer Gate Trolls Won’t Win, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 4, 
2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2015/03/04/brianna-why-gamergate-trolls-won-
win/l2V0PjfDRSf4Fm6F40i9YM/story.html [http://perma.cc/9MF6-AM6C (dark archive)]. 
 106. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Anonymity and Abuse, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (Nov. 
19, 2013), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/11/anonymity-abuse/ [http://perma
.cc/CYD7-D7DH]; Nancy Leong, Consequences and Conclusions, FEMINIST L. 
PROFESSORS (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/12/consequences-
conclusions/ [http://perma.cc/MLS3-Y5RN]; Nancy Leong, Identity and Ideas, FEMINIST L. 
PROFESSORS (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/11/identity-
ideas/ [http://perma.cc/2QWT-BLYG]; Nancy Leong, Privilege and Passivity, FEMINIST L. 
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explained, online harassment has serious consequences, particularly 
for women: 
[N]o matter how hard we attempt to ignore it, this type of 
gendered harassment—and the sheer volume of it—has severe 
implications for women’s status on the Internet. Threats of 
rape, death, and stalking can overpower our emotional 
bandwidth, take up our time, and cost us money through legal 
fees, online protection services, and missed wages.107 
Given the seriousness of the harm caused by cyberharassment, an 
effective legal response is especially important. 
These personal stories have also provided powerful evidence 
that, in general, law enforcement is poorly educated about online 
harassment and ill-equipped to deal with most cyberharassment.108 
Quantitative data show that cyberharassment is quite rarely 
prosecuted—for example, Danielle Citron’s examination of 
government data reveals only about twenty-five online threat 
prosecutions per year109—and the host of recent threats against 
several women made during GamerGate have yet to yield any 
convictions as of the time this Article goes to print.110 
Despite the pervasiveness of problematic online behavior, online 
harassment that employs social media platforms is a new problem for 
courts. There are only a few cases in which a victim has found success 
in the courtroom, and these rare victories generally involve 
 
PROFESSORS (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/12/privileging/ 
[http://perma.cc/C7KQ-R2Z3]. 
 107. Hess, supra note 103. 
 108. Id. (describing how even “larger law enforcement agencies have little capacity or 
drive to investigate” cyberharassment crimes). 
 109. Danielle Citron, United States v. Elonis and the Rarity of Threat Prosecutions, 
FORBES (Dec. 3, 2014, 12:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/12/03
/united-states-v-elonis-and-the-rarity-of-threat-prosecutions/ [http://perma.cc/RFA4-
EA3Z] (“There were on average 25 threat cases pursued to trial or plea a year for the past 
six years.”). 
 110. Admittedly the failure to prosecute the people threatening victims such as 
Sarkeesian, Wu, Quinn, and others is not solely attributable to existing laws. Much of the 
harassment directed at them is clearly criminal under any definition, and the issue is with 
tracking down the perpetrator electronically or, in some instances, simply getting law 
enforcement to act. Other conduct, however, is more ambiguous, and both high-profile 
targets like Sarkeesian, Wu, and Quinn as well as non-famous individuals would benefit 
from clarification of legal elements including the one we address here—the meaning of 
communication. See Caitlin Dewey, Why Is It Taking So Long To Identify the Anonymous 
Gamergate Trolls?, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/the-intersect/wp/2014/10/17/why-is-it-taking-so-long-to-identify-the-anonymous-
gamergate-trolls/ [http://perma.cc/RK5V-82QX]. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 105 (2015) 
2015] COMMUNICATION IN CYBERSPACE 129 
particularly severe instances of harassment.111 The most common 
form of harassment that courts have upheld as cyberharassment is the 
public release of sexually explicit photographs and videos of the 
victim.112 Courts might also find guilt where the harasser has released 
the victim’s private information.113 It is rare that courts will find guilt 
where there is only one instance of a harassing action or if that action 
is not severe.114 
Yet it should be noted that no matter how severe the harassment, 
a court cannot take action if the statute is not properly constructed to 
protect the victim. This can occur if a statute is found 
unconstitutional,115 or—the problem that our Article addresses—if 
the statute does not have a clear definition of what it means to 
communicate. For example, in People v. Barber,116 the defendant 
posted nude photos of his ex-girlfriend online and sent those photos 
 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2014) (involving a 
defendant who created a false Facebook account featuring sexually explicit photographs 
of the victim, and sent emails to the victim’s co-workers and friends also containing 
explicit photographs); United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 428–29 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(involving a defendant who made sexual Craigslist ads, MySpace accounts, and posted 
sexual acts of the victim on pornography sites); People v. Kucharski, 987 N.E.2d 906, 910–
11 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (involving a defendant who hacked his ex-girlfriend’s MySpace page 
and posted a photo of her bending forward wearing only thong underwear and posted her 
phone number and address). 
 112. See, e.g., Kucharski, 987 N.E.2d at 910–11 (involving a defendant who, after 
hacking his ex-girlfriend’s MySpace page, posted sexually explicit photographs of her 
along with her contact information). 
 113. See Greg Miller & David Maharaj, N. Hollywood Man Charged in 1st Cyber-
Stalking Case, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jan/22/news/mn-
523 [http://perma.cc/GDD5-KCKM]. In fact, the first cyberstalking conviction in 
California was based on the release of personal information. Id. In that case, the 
defendant “told numerous men everything from the address of [the victim’s] apartment to 
her physical description, her phone number and how to bypass her home security system.” 
Id. 
 114. As an example of one success, an Ohio court found a defendant guilty where she 
had posted one comment that the victim “[m]olested a little boy.” State v. Ellison, 900 
N.E.2d 228, 229–30 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). Notably, Ohio had a very expansive 
cyberharassment statute providing that “no person shall make or cause to be made a 
telecommunication . . . with purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.” Id. at 
230 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.21(B) (LEXIS through 2008 Reg. Sess.)). 
 115. See, e.g., United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 588 (D. Md. 2011) 
(involving a defendant who had made a Twitter account and tweeted hundreds of 
messages about the victim and was charged under the interstate stalking statute, which was 
found to be an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech as applied to the 
defendant); People v. Marquan, 19 N.E.3d 480, 484–86 (N.Y. 2014) (involving a defendant 
who posted information about his classmates’ sexual practices on Facebook, but the court 
held that the law was overbroad because it had “a wide array of applications that prohibit 
types of protected speech far beyond the cyberbullying of children”). 
 116. No. 2013NY059761, 2014 WL 641316 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Feb. 18, 2014). 
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to her employer, entirely without her consent.117 New York, as a state 
without a cyberharassment statute referencing online communication, 
charged Barber with aggravated harassment in the second degree.118 
While the court found Barber’s actions “reprehensible,” it was unable 
to hold him accountable because the material was not “communicated 
directly” with the victim.119 Ultimately, the court found it insufficient 
that the victim saw that he had posted the photos online and had sent 
the email to her employer.120 
While statistics of cyberharassment trials, convictions, and pleas 
are non-existent at worst and incomplete at best, it is universally 
acknowledged that “[convictions are] a paltry number given the 
estimated number of [cyberharassment] cases a year.”121 Both a cause 
and a consequence of the lack of prosecution of cyberharassment is 
that many important issues remain unaddressed by the courts. As a 
result, law enforcement agencies may remain unsure of what 
constitutes a crime and prosecutors may hesitate to press charges. 
Consequently, a great deal of problematic online behavior remains 
unpunished.122 One element notably lacking in clarity is the meaning 
of “communication.” Using the categories designed in Part I as a 
foundation, the subsequent sections of this Article address this 
problem. 
B. Criminalizing Cyberharassment 
In this Section, we evaluate the current treatment of 
cyberharassment in criminal law. We first consider threshold issues of 
constitutionality. We then present an original empirical survey of 
state cyberharassment laws based on how communication is defined 
in those statutes, and discuss the way that courts have interpreted 
these statutes. 
 
 117. Id. at *2. This phenomenon has become known as “revenge porn,” where a person 
will post sexually explicit photos or videos of his or her ex-significant other, intending to 
publically humiliate them. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing 
Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014). 
 118. Barber, 2014 WL 641316, at *1. Barber was also charged with two other offenses 
that were dismissed on other grounds. Id. at *3–5, *7–9. 
 119. Id. at *1, *4. 
 120. Id. at *6 (“[The defendant] merely posted photographs to his Twitter account, 
where Ms. Batch saw them, and sent them to other parties, who apparently showed them 
to her.”). 
 121. Citron, supra note 109.  
 122. See Sweeney, supra note 100 (describing how a lack of on-point precedent and a 
lack of police training contribute to less prosecution of online harassment). 
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1.  Constitutionality 
Like all laws, cyberharassment statutes must survive 
constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court maintains that “basic 
principles of freedom of speech and press, like the First Amendment’s 
command, do not vary when a new and different medium for 
communication appears.”123 Nonetheless, the Court has also made 
clear that developments in technology influence the appropriate 
interpretation of constitutional rights.124 The First Amendment, then, 
need not be intentionally blind to the way the Internet has changed 
the way we interact with one another. 
This constitutional backdrop makes clear that cyberharassment 
can be criminalized via carefully drawn statutes. The Supreme Court 
has consistently classified emotionally distressing or outrageous 
speech as protected, especially where that speech touches on matters 
of political, religious, or public concern.125 But speech integral to 
criminal conduct is a long-established category of unprotected 
speech.126 For example, “speech is not protected by the First 
Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself” such as in 
crimes of perjury, bribery, extortion and threats, and conspiracy.127 
Likewise, when speech contains “true threats,” as the speech 
criminalized by cyberharassment statutes often does, that speech is 
also unprotected.128 Although the Supreme Court has never clearly 
 
 123. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
 124. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (holding that police 
may not execute a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to an arrest, and, more 
generally, acknowledging evolving technology as a consideration in constitutional 
analysis); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that law-enforcement use 
of a thermal imaging camera in specific circumstances constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment); see also Nancy Leong, Constitutional Rights in the Digital Age, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-
leong/constitutional-rights-in-first-amendment_b_5601216.html [http://perma.cc/UZ9D-
PMVH] (“The Court’s decision in Riley rested on a simple premise: Cell phones are 
different from ordinary physical objects.”). 
 125. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456 (2011) (holding that speech relating to a public 
issue even when causing emotional distress, such as picketing at a funeral, was protected 
by the First Amendment). 
 126. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (“It has rarely 
been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity 
to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a criminal statute.”); 
United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 433–34 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 127. United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1621 
(1964)). 
 128. United States v. Watts, 349 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (“Nevertheless, a statute such 
as this one, which makes criminal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the 
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished 
from what is constitutionally protected speech.”). 
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defined what a true threat is, lower courts have adopted a variety of 
tests.129 
Challengers to cyberharassment statutes therefore raise two 
primary arguments: (1) that the statute is void for vagueness; and (2) 
that the statute is overbroad by punishing protected speech.130 
Courts have declared criminal laws unconstitutionally vague 
using two different approaches.131 First, the statute may be 
unenforceable if it is too vague for the average citizen to understand 
what conduct is criminalized.132 Second, a statute may fail to describe 
explicit standards for when it applies, “thus authorizing or even 
encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”133 
Invalidating vague statutes avoids “punishing people for behavior 
that they could not have known was illegal; . . . subjective 
enforcement of laws based on arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement by government officers; and . . . any chilling effect on the 
exercise of First Amendment freedoms . . . .”134 
When analyzing vagueness, courts apply a “practical rather than 
hypertechnical” test.135 When the statute does not provide explicit 
 
 129. For example, some courts consider a series of factors in determining whether 
speech constitutes a true threat, including: (1) the reaction of the recipient of the speech; 
(2) “whether the threat was conditional”; (3) whether the speaker communicated the 
speech directly to the recipient; (4) whether the speaker “had made similar statements” in 
the past; and (5) whether the recipient “had reason to believe” the speaker could engage 
in violence. Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 409, 420 (2002) (quoting United States v. Dinwiddie, 
76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996) (determining that a student’s rap song threatening 
violence to another student was a true threat)). Other courts use a “reasonable person” 
test, explaining: “[I]f a reasonable person would foresee that an objective rational 
recipient of the statement would interpret its language to constitute a serious 
expression . . . [then] the message conveys a ‘true threat.’ ” United States v. Miller, 115 
F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Smith, 928 F.2d 740, 741 (6th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 852 (1991)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 883 (1997). 
 130. See Sayer, 748 F.3d at 430 (stating that the defendant challenged the 
constitutionality of the cyberstalking statute as “overbroad in violation of the First 
Amendment [and] unconstitutionally vague”). 
 131. People v. Kucharski, 987 N.E.2d 906, 918 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (“First, the statute 
may fail to provide the kind of notice that would enable a person of ordinary intelligence 
to understand what conduct is prohibited. Second, a statute may be declared 
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide explicit standards for those who apply it, thus 
authorizing or even encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (quoting 
People v. Law, 782 N.E.2d 247, 249–50 (Ill. 2002))). 
 132. Id. (stating a statute may be void for vagueness if “the statute may fail to provide 
the kind of notice that would enable a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what 
conduct is prohibited” (quoting Law, 782 N.E.2d at 249)). 
 133. Id. (quoting Law, 782 N.E.2d at 250). 
 134. United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (third alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1256 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 135. United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300, 310 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States 
v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 114 (4th Cir. 1991)). 
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standards of enforcement, “ordinary meaning and common sense” 
determine whether the statute “conveys sufficiently definite warning 
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practices.”136 
Analysis of the federal cyberstalking statute demonstrates the 
way these constitutional principles play out in practice.137 The statute 
prohibits using “any interactive computer service . . . to engage in a 
course of conduct that causes substantial emotional distress . . . .”138 
The federal cyberstalking statute is not unconstitutionally vague 
because it “provide[s] sufficient notice” of the “respective 
prohibitions” and citizens “need not guess what terms such as ‘harass’ 
and ‘intimidate’ mean.”139 Further, the government is only required to 
show that the totality of the defendant’s conduct “evidenced a 
continuity of purpose” to achieve the criminal end.140 
For example, in United States v. Osinger,141 the defendant’s 
“threats, creation of a false Facebook page with sexually explicit 
photographs” of the victim, and emails to the victim’s “co-workers 
and friends containing explicit photographs evinced [an] ‘intent 
to . . . cause substantial emotional distress . . . .’ ”142 Accordingly, the 
court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because 
the defendant “could . . . have known [his conduct] was illegal.”143 
Complementing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Osinger, in Vines 
v. City of New York,144 the Southern District of New York held that 
statutes that criminalize intentional communication with the intent to 
“annoy or alarm” are unconstitutional on both freedom of speech and 
vagueness grounds.145 The court noted that other courts had found 
 
 136. Id. (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)). 
 137. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012). 
 138. Id. 
 139. United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 380 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1182 
(2005); see 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (providing for criminal liability when the person acts “with 
intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person”); United States v. Shepard, No. 
12-10253, 2014 WL 2750117, at *1 (9th Cir. June 18, 2014) (mem.); Osinger, 753 F.3d at 
944–45; United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 436 (1st Cir. 2014); People v. Sucic, 928 
N.E.2d 1231, 1242–44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
 140. Shrader, 675 F.3d at 311 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2266(2) (2012)). Additionally, “the 
statute does not impose a requirement that the government prove that each act was 
intended in isolation to cause serious distress or fear of bodily injury to the victim.” Id. 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2266(2) (2012)). 
 141. 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 142. Id. at 945 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2012)). 
 143. Id. (quoting United States v. Killbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1256 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 144. 305 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 145. See id. at 295, 300–02 (“[The statute] is therefore unconstitutional to the extent it 
prohibits communications, made with the intent to annoy or alarm . . . .”). New York State 
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that determining what language would classify as to “annoy or alarm” 
was too vague of a determination because it would depend on the 
person receiving the communication.146 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has held that “[a]ny vagueness 
associated with the word ‘annoy’ [is] mitigated by the fact that the 
meanings of ‘threaten’ and ‘harass’ can easily be ascertained and have 
generally accepted meanings.”147 Thus, the court “suggests that the 
words annoy, abuse, threaten or harass should be read together to be 
given similar meanings.”148 
The Supreme Court has not addressed this specific language 
issue. Lower courts, however, have either taken the inclusion 
approach or have simply read the word “annoy” out of the statute, 
holding that the remainder is sufficiently specific to survive 
scrutiny.149 
A criminal law may violate the First Amendment if it restricts 
general speech that is not a “true threat”150 or “fighting words.”151 But 
the federal cyberstalking statute does not prohibit protected speech 
because it is the conduct rather than the speech that is prohibited.152 
The conduct governed by cyberharassment statutes is not protected 
by the First Amendment153 because the statutes only prohibit conduct 
 
courts have similarly held. See People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805, 813–14 (N.Y. 2014) (“[W]e 
conclude that [the statute] is unconstitutional under both the State and Federal 
Constitutions, and we vacate defendant’s convictions on these counts.”). 
 146. See Vines, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 300–01 (citing People v. Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d 169, 
176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)). Additionally, the court found intent to “annoy or alarm” to be 
protected under the Constitution because communication that alarms or annoys does not 
constitute fighting words or true threats and, therefore, that the speech at issue was “fully 
protected speech that may not be proscribed or punished.” Id. at 299–300 (citing Virginia 
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003)) (“[The defendant’s] communications do not fall into 
one of the defined categories of unprotected speech . . . [accordingly] such communications 
are fully protected speech that may not be proscribed or punished.” (citations omitted)). 
 147. United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 383 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Staley v. Jones, 
239 F.3d 769, 791–92 (6th Cir. 2001)), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1182 (2005) 
(mem.). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See, e.g., id. at 382–83 (“[T]he words annoy, abuse, threaten or harass should be 
read together to be given similar meanings.”). 
 150. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 
 151. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). 
 152. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012) (providing criminal liability for those who “place [a 
target] under surveillance” or “place a person . . . in reasonable fear of death, or serious 
bodily injury”); see also State v. Hemmingway, 825 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) 
(“[I]ntimidating conduct serves no legitimate purpose and merits no First Amendment 
protection.”). 
 153. United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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with both “malicious intent on the part of the defendant and 
substantial harm” to the target.154 
The federal cyberstalking statute specifically criminalizes “a 
course of conduct that causes substantial emotional distress”155 and 
provides: “[t]he term ‘course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct 
composed of two or more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.”156 
Thus, the requirement of two or more acts relates to the criminalized 
conduct rather than the speech itself.157 The element of threatening 
intent also clarifies what speech the cyberharassment statute 
prohibits.158 Therefore, the threat element narrows the punishable 
behavior “such that the defendant must ‘knowingly and without 
lawful justification’ specifically intend to ‘harass’ the [target] by 
transmitting the threat.”159 
Only one federal district court has held that the indictment of a 
defendant under the federal cyberstalking statute violated the First 
Amendment.160 In United States v. Cassidy,161 the prosecution indicted 
an individual for tweets and blog posts that were critical of a “well-
known religious figure” and that questioned the subject’s “character 
and qualifications as a religious leader.”162 In the specific context of 
the particular indictment, the court held that the indictment violated 
the First Amendment, but explicitly declined to consider whether the 
cyberstalking statute was facially invalid.163 
Thus, cyberharassment and cyberstalking statutes can be drafted 
in a manner that complies with the requirements of the First 
Amendment. And, in general, the federal courts have found that the 
federal cyberstalking statute is drafted in such a way. 
 
 154. United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2261(2)(A) (2012)). 
 155. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B)(iii). 
 156. 18 U.S.C. § 2266(2) (2012). 
 157. United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 158. People v. Sucic, 928 N.E.2d 1231, 1241 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). Threats are not 
protected under the First Amendment. See id. (“Therefore, the element of speech in the 
cyberstalking statute, the threat, does not fall within the protections of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 159. Id. (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West 2008)). 
 160. United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 587–88 (D. Md. 2011) (“In this case, 
the Court concludes that the statute is unconstitutional as applied . . . .”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 583. 
 163. Id. at 587–88 (“In this case, the Court concludes that the statute is 
unconstitutional as applied, and thus it is unnecessary to address the parties’ arguments as 
to whether . . . [the statute] is facially invalid.”). 
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2.  Statutory Definitions of Communication 
This Section examines how cyberharassment statutes currently 
define “communication.” All cyberharassment statutes have three 
elements: intentional mens rea with respect to the making of the 
communication, threatening or harassing communication, and the 
victim’s knowledge of the communication. We divided the current 
statutes into five categories based on how communication is 
statutorily defined. A chart containing all the statutes is appended to 
this Article.164 
a. Category 1: No Reference to Online Communication 
Some states do not refer to online communication in any criminal 
statutes. This is true in six states: Delaware, Maine, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, and New York.165 
b. Category 2: Undefined “Electronic Communication” 
Sixteen states—Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia—criminalize 
threatening “electronic communication,” but do not define electronic 
communication.166 Of these statutes, only Florida, Rhode Island, and 
Virginia have separate “Cyberstalking” or “Harassment by 
Computer” statutes.167 All other states in Category 2 include 
electronic communication within the “Harassment” or “Stalking” 
statute.168 
 
 164. See infra Appendix. 
 165. Westlaw searches for various categories of “online communication” returned no 
results for these states. 
 166. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 499); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.41.270 (LEXIS through 2015 legislation); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-182b (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (Supp. 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 711-1106 (LEXIS through 2015 Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 18-7906 (LEXIS through 
2015 Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.); 
IOWA CODE § 708.7 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. 2015); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 565.225 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 
(West, Westlaw through July 2015 Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07 (LEXIS through 
2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (LEXIS through Jan. 2015 Sess.); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (LEXIS through 2015 Gen. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1027 
(LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (2014). 
 167. FLA. STAT. § 784.048; 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
152.7:1. 
 168. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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c. Category 3: Statutorily Specified Communication 
Nine states—Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, 
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia—
criminalize and define threatening “electronic communication” with 
an inclusive list of ways to electronically communicate.169 However, 
these statutes omit many types of communication in their definitions. 
For example, Arizona defines electronic communication as only “a 
wire line, cable, wireless or cellular telephone call, a text message, an 
instant message or electronic mail.”170 
d. Category 4: All Direct Victim Communication 
Twelve states—California, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, 
Texas, and Wyoming—and federal law define threatening 
communication to include all types of communication, but require 
that the threatening language be directed at a particular target.171 
Interpretation of the statutory language “directed at a person” varies 
from state to state. 
For example, Louisiana defines electronic communication as 
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature, transmitted in whole or in part by wire, 
radio, computer, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical 
system.”172 The statute defines electronic mail as “use of the Internet, 
a computer, a facsimile machine, a pager, a cellular telephone, a video 
 
 169. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2916 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 
(2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5427 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 508.130 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Spec. Sess.); W. VA. CODE § 61-3C-14a (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess.). 
 170. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2916(E). 
 171. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West 2010); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:40.3 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW 
§ 3-805 (LEXIS through 2015 Legis. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 
(LEXIS through 2015 legislation); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1172 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 1st Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.065 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-308 (Supp. 2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (LEXIS through 
2015 Legis. Sess.). 
 172. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3(1). 
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recorder, or other electronic means . . . .”173 This communication must, 
however, be “sent to a person identified by a unique address or 
address number and received by that person.”174 
Other state statutes take similar approaches. For example, 
Mississippi criminalizes all types of electronic mail or electronic 
communication with “another, repeatedly, whether or not 
conversation ensues.”175 Similarly, in its stalking statute, Wyoming 
criminalizes “[c]ommunicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing 
a communication with another person by verbal, electronic, 
mechanical, telegraphic, telephonic or written means”176 when those 
communications are “directed at a specific person.”177 
e. Category 5: Reasonable Victim’s Knowledge of 
Communication 
Seven states—Arkansas, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, 
South Carolina, and Wisconsin—have stalking or harassment statutes 
that do not require a statement to be made directly to the person.178 
Instead, they criminalize any statement made that would cause a 
reasonable recipient to feel threatened.179 For example, Nevada 
criminalizes any “display or distribut[ion] of information in a manner 
that substantially increases the risk of harm or violence to the 
victim.”180 Similarly, although Minnesota does not have a separate 
cyberstalking statute, the general stalking statute criminalizes “any 
communication made through any available technologies”181 that “the 
actor knows or has reason to know would cause the victim under the 
 
 173. Id. § 14:40.3(2). 
 174. Id. 
 175. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15(b). 
 176. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(b)(i). 
 177. Id. § 6-2-506(a) (emphasis added). 
 178. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-217 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.749 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 (Supp. 2014); WIS. 
STAT. § 947.0125 (2015). 
 179. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700(C) (“ ‘Stalking’ means a pattern of 
words . . . intended to cause and does cause a targeted person and would cause a 
reasonable person in the targeted person’s position to fear [harm].”). Category 5 differs 
from Category 1 in the following ways: the states in Category 1 do not have online 
communication within their criminal statutes, and the state statutes in Category 5 
explicitly include language about online communication. See supra notes 165, 178 and 
accompanying text. 
 180. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575. 
 181. MINN. STAT. § 609.749(1b)(b). 
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circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, 
or intimidated.”182 
3.  Judicial Definitions of Communication 
This Section explains how courts have defined the term 
“communication” in cases involving online behavior. Just as different 
cyberstalking statutes define communication differently, case law 
defining communication varies based on the statutory requirements. 
All of the courts that have considered the issue have held that 
emails sent to the target satisfy the requirement of direct 
communication with the victim.183 Moreover, an Internet message can 
be a “true threat” not protected by the First Amendment, even 
without being sent directly to the victim.184 
In New York, a state trial court went a step further and held that 
messages in a newsgroup, similar to a blog, also qualify as a direct 
communication. In People v. Munn,185 the defendant posted a 
message asking readers to kill a police sergeant and all other 
members of the NYPD.186 The message was in a “newsgroup,” posted 
daily and read by a group of regular participants, but open to be read 
by anyone with a computer and online capabilities.187 The court found 
that defendant’s posting on an Internet newsgroup “with the 
complainant’s name . . . transformed the communication to one not 
only intended for the general public, but specially generated to be 
communicated to the complainant.”188 Therefore, the court 
determined that communications in a public newsgroup message 
 
 182. Id. § 609.749(1). 
 183. See United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 374, 388 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated on 
other grounds, 543 U.S. 1182 (2005) (mem.); People v. Munn, 688 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385–86 
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999); M.G. v. C.G., No. O-00000-00, 2008 WL 1869738, at *3 (N.Y. Fam. 
Ct. Apr. 28, 2008); Barson v. Commonwealth, 726 S.E.2d 292, 294 (Va. 2012). Florida, 
however, has held that changing an email password and appropriating emails is not 
cyberstalking because it is not electronic communication directed at the victim, as required 
by the statute. Young v. Young, 96 So. 3d 478, 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
 184. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015) (“Here ‘the crucial 
element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct’ is the threatening nature of 
the communication. The mental state requirement must therefore apply to the fact that the 
communication contains a threat.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994))); People v. Diomedes, 13 N.E.3d 125, 135 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2014) (“However, the first amendment permits restrictions on some forms of speech, 
including ‘true threats’ . . . .”). 
 185. 688 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999). 
 186. Id. at 385. 
 187. Id. at 386 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850–51 (1997)). 
 188. Id. 
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qualified as written communication directed at the person for 
purposes of harassment.189 
But other courts’ failure to use a definition of communication 
that reflects the way people actually use the Internet results in missed 
opportunities to convict individuals who have clearly engaged in 
online behavior that terrorized their victims. 
In State v. Ellison,190 for example, the defendant posted a picture 
of the target to MySpace with a caption stating that the target “liked 
to molest little boys.”191 The MySpace post was available to the public 
but not sent directly to the target.192 The relevant Ohio statute 
prohibited “telecommunication . . . with [the] purpose to abuse, 
threaten, or harass another person,”193 and the trial court convicted 
the defendant of “telecommunications harassment.”194 
On appeal, however, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined that 
“the statute creates a specific-intent crime: the state must prove the 
defendant’s specific purpose to harass.”195 The court held that direct 
contact with the target was not necessary, but that the state must 
prove the intent of the defendant was to harass the target.196 The 
defendant claimed, and the court agreed, that the intent of the 
defendant was to warn the public of the target’s character and not to 
harass the target.197 The court reversed the conviction.198 
Ellison reveals a misplaced focus on the intent of the defendant 
rather than—in keeping with the purpose of cyberharassment statutes 
in general, which is to avoid disruption and fear in innocent citizens’ 
lives—a focus on whether a threatening or severely distressing 
message was communicated to the target. Such communication 
should be the focus. After all, the point of cyberharassment statutes is 
to prevent the harms arising from such communication. 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. 900 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
 191. Id. at 229. 
 192. Id. (“Ellison allowed for public, rather than private, viewing of her MySpace 
page.”). 
 193. Id. at 230. 
 194. Id. at 229–30. 
 195. Id. at 230. 
 196. Id. at 230–31 (“[W]e decline to hold that a direct contact is required to establish a 
telecommunication under the statute.”). 
 197. Id. at 231 (“Thus, we hold that the state failed to establish that Ellison had made a 
telecommunication with the purpose to harass, where she had a legitimate purpose for 
posting the accusation against [the target] on the Internet, and where Ellison did not 
directly telecommunicate with [the target].”). 
 198. Id. 
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By way of further example, prosecutors have simply declined to 
press charges because of the inadequacy of statutory tools at their 
disposal. In September of 2006, Lori Drew became concerned that 
Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old neighbor, was spreading rumors 
about her daughter.199 Drew created a false MySpace account in the 
name of “Josh Evans.”200 Drew used the MySpace account to pretend 
to be a sixteen-year-old boy and to flirt with Meier.201 “Josh Evans” 
began sending Meier negative messages on October 15, 2006, and 
continued throughout the next day.202 On October 16, “Josh Evans” 
sent Meier a message stating that “[t]he world would be a better place 
without you.”203 Additional MySpace members whose profiles 
reflected links with the “Josh Evans” profile also began to send Meier 
disparaging messages.204 Subsequently, Meier’s mother discovered 
that her daughter had hanged herself in her bedroom closet.205 
Missouri prosecutors did not press charges because they could not 
prove Drew intended to cause emotional distress.206 Yet again, this 
focus is misplaced. The disruption to Meier’s life is the harm that the 
statute is intended to prevent, and consequently the prosecution 
should focus on the nature of the communication.207 
 
 199. Jennifer Steinhauer, Woman Who Posed as Boy Testifies in Case that Ended in 
Suicide of 13-Year-Old, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21
/us/21myspace.html?fta=y [http://perma.cc/CA83-L7XA (dark archive)]. 
 200. The Story of Megan Meier, MEGAN MEIER FOUND., http://www
.meganmeierfoundation.org/megans-story.html [http://perma.cc/LRL3-HU97] [hereinafter 
Megan Meier]. 
 201. See id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. (“ ‘They are posting bulletins about me’ . . . [saying] ‘Megan Meier is a slut. 
Megan Meir is fat.’ ”). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Prosecutor: No Criminal Charges in MySpace Suicide, FOX NEWS (Dec. 3, 2007), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/12/03/prosecutor-no-criminal-charges-in-myspace-
suicide/ [http://perma.cc/YF8H-EL9N?type=live]. 
 207. A similar example of unprosecuted cyberharassment occurred in Tampa, Florida 
in 2012. There, an ex-mistress, Paula Broadwell, sent anonymous threatening emails to the 
wife of David Petraeus, with whom she had an affair. Matthew Lysiak, Menacing Emails 
Sent by David Petraeus’ Ex-Mistress Paula Broadwell to Socialite Jill Kelley Promised to 
Make the Apparent Rival ‘Go Away’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 20, 2012, 2:30 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/broadwell-emails-kelley-sinister-previously-
reported-article-1.1204956 [http://perma.cc/CPW8-9QZ3 (dark archive)]. In the emails, 
Broadwell touted her military background in a threatening manner and boasted of having 
“powerful” friends. Id. The target saw the emails as death threats, specifically one in which 
Broadwell vowed to “make [her] go away.” Id. But prosecutors never filed charges, again, 
because of the focus on intent rather than the focus on communication and the disruption 
it causes. See Pete Williams, Paula Broadwell Won’t Face Cyberstalking Charges in 
Petraeus Scandal, NBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2012, 10:49 AM), http://investigations.nbcnews
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Finally, the recent passage of statutes that strive to criminalize 
the phenomenon known as “revenge porn” also reveal the 
deficiencies in current cyberharassment statutes.208 Revenge porn—
more accurately known as “non-consensual pornography”—consists 
of online posting of nude pictures of another person without that 
person’s consent.209 Often, although not always, the person who posts 
the pictures is an angry ex-partner.210 Some websites exist solely for 
the purpose of posting non-consensual pornography.211 Posting such 
pictures is often a mechanism of communication. For example, the 
website MyEx.com invites users to post links to the email address, 
phone number, Facebook page, LinkedIn page, and other 
information of people depicted in uploaded photos.212 Therefore, 
other users can send threatening and harassing messages to the 
person depicted in the photos, with the result that the person depicted 
would find out about the pictures and potentially realize who 
uploaded them. It is difficult to imagine a clearer way to communicate 
hatred or contempt to the person depicted in the photos. But such 
activity would not be covered under most of the aforementioned 
statutory schemes. Thus, the example of non-consensual pornography 
reveals the shortcomings of cyberharassment statutes as a tool to 
address many forms of online abuse. 
III.  UPDATING THE MEANING OF “COMMUNICATION” 
This Part first briefly articulates the problems associated with the 




 208. Citron & Franks, supra note 117, at 346. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See, e.g., MyEx.com Get Revenge! Naked Pics of Your Ex, MYEX.COM, http://
www.myex.com [http://perma.cc/L8DL-SP4A]. Another popular site, IsAnybodyUp.com, 
averaged thirty million views a month at its peak. Daniel Kreps, Revenge-Porn Site Owner 
Hunter Moore Pleads Guilty, Faces Prison Time, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/revenge-porn-site-owner-hunter-moore-pleads-
guilty-faces-prison-time-20150220 [http://perma.cc/YFG8-XKY2]. IsAnybodyUp.com shut 
down in 2012 because of intense public pressure. Id. Note that while the website founder 
was indicted and eventually pled guilty, it was not on charges related specifically to the 
protection of revenge-porn victims, “as many states’ cyber-laws still haven’t been 
revamped to confront the relatively new phenomenon.” Jessica Roy, Revenge-Porn King 
Hunter Moore, the ‘Most Hated Man on the Internet,’ Is Going to Jail, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 19, 
2015, 1:34 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/02/revenge-porn-hunter-moore-
jail.html [http://perma.cc/ELN9-WX77]. 
 212. See Submit Pics and Stories of Your Ex, MYEX.COM, http://www.myex.com/add-
your-ex/ [http://perma.cc/3MRT-D2CN]. 
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“communication.” It then proposes a definition that can be used by 
both legislatures and courts, and finally, offers concrete examples that 
demonstrate why this definition is sensible. 
A. Statutory Proposal 
As we have explained, the myriad ways that people interact on 
the Internet requires a careful and precise definition of 
“communication” in cyberharassment statutes.213 As we have argued, 
such a definition should include any form of online behavior where a 
reasonable person knew or recklessly disregarded a reasonable 
likelihood that the target would learn about the behavior.214 
Currently, many cyberharassment statutes—including the federal 
statute—define cyberharassment by focusing on the use of an 
electronic communications device to engage in a “course of 
conduct.”215 We think that altering the federal statute and others like 
it to criminalize communication that focuses on the interaction 
between the speaker and the target is more effective and realistic in 
light of changing technology. 
We propose the following language to describe the interaction 
between the speaker and the target: 
An individual commits the crime of cyberharassment when 
he or she knowingly and repeatedly engages in online 
communication about the target in a manner that a 
reasonable person would find threatening or in a manner 
that would cause a reasonable person severe emotional 
distress, and that the target did in fact find threatening or 
severely emotionally distressing. 
(a) “Communication” is defined as speech or conduct using 
any electronic medium when the individual knew or 
recklessly disregarded a substantial likelihood that the 
target would learn about the speech or conduct; 
(b) “Repeatedly” means more than once. 
The first part of the statute closely tracks the language in existing 
cyberharassment statutes whose constitutionality courts have 
 
 213. See supra Section I.C. 
 214. See supra Part I. 
 215. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(B)(iii) (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.270 (LEXIS through 
2015 legislation); FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (Supp. 2015); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805 
(LEXIS through 2015 Legis. Sess.). 
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upheld.216 By requiring that the speech is either threatening or 
severely emotionally distressing, the statute avoids criminalizing 
speech that is merely annoying or disparaging. Thus, this language 
focuses on speech whose prohibition, as Justice O’Connor articulated 
in Virginia v. Black,217 “ ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of 
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition to 
protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence 
will occur.’ ”218 
Key to our project is subsection (a), which defines 
communication. We employ a definition that includes only speech or 
conduct when the perpetrator either knew there was a substantial 
likelihood that the target would find out about the speech or conduct 
or recklessly disregarded a substantial likelihood that the target 
would find out about the speech. This definition goes to the heart of 
the harms caused by threatening or distressing communications on 
the Internet. If the perpetrator knows or disregards a substantial 
likelihood that the target will find out about a particular instance of 
online behavior, the behavior is closely akin to the type of direct 
communication (e.g., letters or phone calls) that were criminalized in 
the pre-Internet world. In the next Section, we explain how our 
statute—and its careful and precise definition of communication—will 
apply to a range of behavior on the Internet. 
B. Examples 
Finally, we turn to the task of articulating how our proposed 
definition of communication would play out in the context of several 
examples spanning a range of social media platforms. In each 
instance, we demonstrate that the speaker knew or recklessly 
disregarded the reasonable likelihood that the subject would learn of 
the speech and, therefore, that the activity should count as 
communication. We demonstrate not only that the test works across 




 216. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text. 
 217. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 218. Id. at 359–60 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
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Example 1: Allison is Facebook friends with Brenda. Allison 
writes a post about Brenda on Facebook that is visible to all of 
Allison’s Facebook friends. 
 
This example qualifies as communication under our definition. 
Even if Allison does not tag Brenda in the post, people often see their 
friends’ posts on Facebook while browsing their own news feeds—the 
average American now spends forty minutes per day on Facebook,219 
and some check far more frequently.220 Additionally, Allison and 
Brenda’s mutual friends would likely inform Brenda of the post, or 
ask her questions about it if the post was at all interesting or 
salacious. In the unlikely event that Allison believed that Brenda 
would not find out about the post, Allison would have had to 
recklessly disregard the amount of time and how most people use 
Facebook as well as the likelihood that mutual friends would alert 
Brenda of the post’s existence. A post made with such reckless 
disregard should qualify as communication. 
 
Example 2: Cesar and Dave are not Facebook friends, but they 
have many mutual Facebook friends. Cesar and Dave attend the 
same high school. Cesar writes a post about Dave. 
 
Under our proposed statutory language, this example likewise 
qualifies as communication. Even though Dave may never see the 
Facebook post himself, the many mutual friends of Cesar and Dave 
make it likely that Dave would find out about the post. On Facebook, 
it is easy to tell how many mutual friends one shares with another 
person, regardless of whether one is friends with that person.221 Thus, 
Cesar would have to recklessly disregard the readily available 
information that he and Dave had multiple mutual friends in order to 
 
 219. Joshua Brustein, Americans Now Spend More Time on Facebook than They Do on 
Their Pets, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-
23/heres-how-much-time-people-spend-on-facebook-daily [http://perma.cc/6FR3-A6XN]. 
 220. Stephen Marche, Is Facebook Making Us Lonely?, ATLANTIC (May 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/05/is-facebook-making-us-
lonely/308930/ [http://perma.cc/VXT4-X5ND] (“Among 18-to-34-year-olds, nearly half 
check Facebook minutes after waking up, and 28 percent do so before getting out of 
bed.”). 
 221. See People You May Know, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help
/501283333222485/ [https://perma.cc/AQF8-VGBF]. 
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believe that none of the mutual friends would alert the subject to the 
communication. 
 
Example 3: Ed writes one post about Frida on Reddit. 
 
Reddit is a website that bills itself as “the front page of the 
Internet.”222 It is divided into a large number of forums, all of which 
are publicly accessible and in any of which anyone can write a post of 
any length.223 The site constantly updates itself, making certain 
content more or less visible depending on the number of views the 
content has received and the time since the posting.224 All posts are 
publicly available until the post is removed by their creators.225 
If Ed writes one post about Frida on Reddit, his post should not 
qualify as communication because it is a single incident and Frida is 
unlikely to find out about it. If the isolated post is the only thing Ed 
has ever written about Frida, neither Frida nor people close to her 
would have any reason to be on alert for a posting about her. Further, 
if Ed’s post was the only thing he had written about Frida, it is 
unlikely that even if someone close to Frida saw the blog that they 
would tell her about it. And perhaps most importantly, Reddit 
contains an enormous amount of ever-changing information. Absent 
unusual circumstances not present in our hypothetical, the post about 
Frida would not become prominent. In this instance, Ed has not 
recklessly disregarded a reasonable likelihood that Frida would find 
out about the Reddit post. 
 
Example 4: Gary creates a blog dedicated to writing disparaging 
and threatening posts about Holden. 
 
Anyone with access to the Internet can create a blog. While some 
blogs cost money to create and maintain, many platforms, such as 
Tumblr, Blogspot, and Blogger, allow people to create blogs for 
free.226 The settings on a particular blog may allow comments from 
 
 222. Reddit: The Front Page of the Internet, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com 
[http://perma.cc/SE5T-SSY7]. 
 223. Can Anyone Post on Reddit?, REDDIT, https://reddit.zendesk.com/hc/en-us
/articles/205166565-Can-anyone-post-on-Reddit- [https://perma.cc/VK4V-4HDM]. 
 224. See What is Reddit?, REDDIT, https://reddit.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/204511479
-What-is-Reddit- [http://perma.cc/637Q-KKZF]. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See, e.g., TUMBLR, supra note 94. 
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viewers, or the blog may exist only as a forum for the author of the 
blog. While blogs may be public or private, a public blog can be 
viewed by anyone and the posts are available until they are taken 
down by the owner of the blog. 
A blog dedicated to negative commentary about Holden should 
qualify as communication so long as the blog is public. If the blog is 
public, it is likely that someone who knows Holden may see the blog 
since the posts remain online until the author takes them down. 
Additionally, most people “Google” themselves occasionally in order 
to know what is on the Internet about them.227 Some even have 
Google or mention alerts on their names.228 And others, such as 
potential dates229 or potential employers,230 also Google people. Given 
all of these possible avenues for learning about the blog via Internet 
searches, Gary’s creation of the blog about Holden should qualify as 
communication because it is reasonably likely that Holden would find 
out about the blog. 
 
Example 5: Ida creates a Craigslist ad that includes Jaliah’s 
phone number and address and states that Jaliah is willing to 
have sex for money. 
 
Craigslist is a website that allows anyone to post an ad that is 
made available to the public online.231 The website categorizes the 
 
 227. Majority of Online Americans ‘Google Themselves’, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 27, 2013), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/27/majority-of-online-americans-google-
themselves/ [http://perma.cc/LJ37-S53Z] (finding that as of 2013, fifty-six percent of 
Americans admit to Googling themselves online). 
 228. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Please, I Beg You, Put a Google Alert on Your Name, 
FORBES (Sept. 18, 2009, 11:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2009/09/18
/google-alerts/ [http://perma.cc/MJ3K-TJUT] (explaining the importance of Google 
alerts). 
 229. See Roy Uphold, Why You Should Never Google Someone Before a First Date 
(Video), ELITE DAILY (June 4, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://elitedaily.com/women/never-admit-
google-person-first-date/1051472/ [http://perma.cc/5D2R-D3GR] (cautioning against Googling 
someone before a date as a universal experience); see also Joanna Person, So, Tell Me 
Everything I Know About You, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/09/14/fashion/14love.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& [http://perma.cc/4JLY-YX74 (dark 
archive)] (describing humorous repercussions of Googling someone before a date). 
 230. Susan P. Joyce, What 80% of Employers Do Before Inviting You for an Interview, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2015, 7:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-p-
joyce/job-search-tips_b_4834361.html [http://perma.cc/SLV3-N2KN] (showing that eighty 
percent of employers Google potential employees). 
 231. Craigslist is a website of “[l]ocal classifieds and forums—community moderated, 
and largely free.” About, CRAIGSLIST, https://www.craigslist.org/about/ [https://perma.cc
/4A9P-N8BX]. 
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postings by topic, such as “For Sale,” “Wanted,” “Housing,” “Casual 
Encounters,” and so forth.232 The ads are visible to anyone on the 
Internet, although in some instances they expire after a specified 
length of time, such as a week.233 Posts often include contact 
information for the party who has (supposedly) created the 
advertisement.234 
Ida’s Craigslist posting about Jaliah qualifies as communication. 
The posting itself would solicit calls to Jaliah’s phone number and in-
person visits to her address. As a result, Jaliah would likely find out 
about the Craigslist posting even though she might not see it herself. 
Ida’s posting of Jaliah’s contact information would establish Ida’s 
knowledge of a reasonable likelihood that Jaliah would be contacted 
and, therefore, that Jaliah would discover the posting. 
 
Example 6: Keith and Leah both use Twitter. Keith writes several 
public tweets about Leah threatening to harm her and her family. 
He mentions Leah by her full name but does not include her 
Twitter handle. Keith and Leah each have about five-hundred 
Twitter followers, but they do not have any Twitter followers in 
common. 
 
While this is a close case, we believe that this example should 
qualify as communication. Admittedly Keith has not used the “@” 
symbol to call Leah’s attention to his tweets, and the lack of mutual 
followers diminishes the likelihood that anyone will mention the 
tweets to Leah. With that said, there are a number of ways that Leah 
could find out about the tweets, such that she is reasonably likely to 
do so. Given that the tweets are public, Leah could find the tweets by 
Googling her name.235 She could also find them by using Twitter’s 
search function to search for her name.236 Because the tweets are 
threatening, it is possible that one of Keith’s Twitter followers would 
reach out to Leah and alert her to the tweets. And, as in Example 4, 
 
 232. See id. 
 233. See Expirations by Posting Type, CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/about/help
/posting_lifespans [https://perma.cc/M4AZ-V2KU]. 
 234. See How to Post, CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/about/help/how_to_post 
[http://perma.cc/L9NC-ADYR]. 
 235. See Hill, supra note 228. 
 236. One can do this simply by typing a user’s name or Twitter handle into the search 
bar within Twitter. See Using Twitter Search, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles
/132700# [http://perma.cc/B7G9-Z7EC]. 
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another person might Google Leah’s name, find the tweets, and let 
Leah know the tweets exist. 
 
Example 7: Mike creates a Snapchat video threatening Nick. 
Mike is not friends with Nick or any people who know Nick. 
 
Snapchat is a cell phone application that allows users to post 
photos and videos within the application.237 Other users who also have 
the application can view the videos and photos of people from their 
phone contact list.238 In order to view a user’s Snapchat photo or 
video, a person must have the phone number and be accepted as a 
friend by the person who posts the video.239 All photos and videos are 
available, at most, for 24 hours from the time of posting.240 Each 
photo or video may be viewed multiple times within the allotted time 
period.241 
The Snapchat video should not qualify as communication. First, 
Nick would be very unlikely to see the video himself. Because 
Snapchat users are friends through cell phone numbers, the only 
people that would have access to the Snapchat video would be Mike’s 
close friends who have his cell phone number. Here, Mike has not 
accepted Nick or any of Nick’s friends to be able to view his Snapchat 
photos or videos. Additionally, Snapchat videos expire and are 
inaccessible after twenty-four hours. This further decreases the 
likelihood that Nick will find out about the video. Thus, this should 
not qualify as communication. Indeed, even if Nick did in fact find out 
about the video through some unusual set of circumstances, Mike did 
not disregard a reasonable likelihood that he would do so, and thus 
the test for communication is not satisfied. 
CONCLUSION 
New technology creates new ways of interacting and requires a 
more robust definition of communication. Here, we have established 
a definition of communication that addresses existing means of online 
 
 237. Elyse Betters, What’s the Point of Snapchat, and How Does it Work?, POCKET-LINT 
(JAN. 29, 2015), http://www.pocket-lint.com/news/131313-what-s-the-point-of-snapchat-and-
how-does-it-work [http://perma.cc/R9MC-KEWS]. 
 238. Snapchat allows users to send photos directly to another user by using their 
phone’s contacts or by entering a username. SNAPCHAT, supra note 71. 
 239. Betters, supra note 237. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
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interaction and can adapt to new ones. Incorporating this definition of 
communication into statutes criminalizing cyberharassment will 
improve the efficacy of those statutes at detecting and punishing 
problematic online behavior that rises to a level that society deems 
worthy of criminal sanction. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Jurisdiction Category Communication Language Citation 
Alabama 2 
“[I]nitiates communication, 





through 2015 Act 
499); ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-11-8 
(West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Act 
499) 
Alaska 2 
“[S]ending mail or electronic 









wire line, cable, wireless or 
cellular telephone call, a text, 
an instant message, or 
electronic mail.” 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-2916 
(West, Westlaw 
through 2015 1st 
Reg. Sess.) 
Arkansas 5 
Communication of any kind 
made through “electronic 
means” (cites local bulletin, 
chat room, social media, 
instant messaging). 
ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-71-217 
(LEXIS through 
2015 Reg. Sess.) 
California 4 
“[T]elephones, cellular 
phones, computers, video 
recorders, facsimile machines, 
pagers, personal digital 
assistants, smartphones, and 
any other device that transfers 
signs, signals, writing, images, 





“[C]ommunication with a 
person . . . anonymously or 
otherwise, by telephone, 
telephone network, data 
network, text message, instant 
message, computer, computer 





2015 Reg. Sess.) 
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Jurisdiction Category Communication Language Citation 





2015 Reg. Sess.) 
 
Delaware 1 N/A N/A 
Federal 4 
“[U]ses the mail, any 
interactive computer service 
or electronic communication 
service or electronic 





“[M]eans to engage in a 
course of conduct to 
communicate, or to cause to 
be communicated, words, 
images, or language by or 
through the use of electronic 






“[C]ommunication in person, 
by telephone, by mail, by 
broadcast, by computer, by 
computer network, or by any 
other electronic device; . . . .” 
GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-5-90 (2011) 
Hawaii 2 
“[T]elephone calls, facsimile 
transmissions, or any form of 
electronic communication . . . 
including electronic mail 
transmissions . . . .” 
HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 711-1106 
(LEXIS through 
2015 Sess.)  
Idaho 2 
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Jurisdiction Category Communication Language Citation 
Illinois 5 
“ ‘Electronic communication’ 
means any transfer of signs, 
signals, writings, sounds, data, 
or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part 
by a wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, 
photoelectric, or photo-optical 
system . . . [i]ncluding, but not 
limited to, a telephone, 
cellular phone, computer, or 
pager, which communication 
includes, but is not limited to, 
e-mail, instant message, text 
message, or voice mail.” 




2015 Reg. Sess.) 
Indiana 2 





2015 First Reg. 
Sess.) 
Iowa 2 
“Communicates with another 
by telephone, telegraph, 





2015 Reg. Sess.) 
Kansas 3 
“[I]mpart a message by any 
method of transmission, 
including, but not limited to: 
Telephoning, personally 
delivering, sending or having 
delivered, any information or 
material by written or printed 
note or letter, package, mail, 
courier service or electronic 
transmission, including 
electronic transmissions 
generated or communicated 
via a computer; . . . .” 
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Jurisdiction Category Communication Language Citation 
Kentucky 3 
“[Use of] computers, the 
Internet or other electronic 
network, cameras or other 
recording devices, telephones 
or other personal 
communications devices, 
scanners or other copying 
devices, and any device that 
enables the use of a 
transmitting device.” 






“[A]ny transfer of signs, 
signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of 
any nature, transmitted in 
whole or in part by wire, 
radio, computer, 
electromagnetic, 
photoelectric, or photo-optical 
system . . . use of the Internet, 
a computer, a facsimile 
machine, a pager, a cellular 
telephone, a video recorder, 
or other electronic 
means . . . .” 




2015 Reg. Sess.) 
Maine  1 N/A N/A 
Maryland 4 
“[T]ransmission of 
information, data, or a 
communication by the use of a 
computer or any other 
electronic means” such as 
“information service, system, 
or access software provider 
that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple 
users to a computer server, 
including a system that 
provides access to the Internet 
and cellular phones.” 
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Jurisdiction Category Communication Language Citation 
Massachusetts 4 
“[C]onduct, acts or threats 
conducted by mail or by use of 
a telephonic or 
telecommunication device or 
electronic communication 
device including, but not 
limited to, any device that 
transfers signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, 
or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part 
by a wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photo-
electronic or photo-optical 
system, including, but not 
limited to, electronic mail, 
internet communications, 
instant messages or facsimile 
communications.” 
MASS. GEN. 






“[A]ny medium of 
communication, including the 
internet or a computer, 
computer program, computer 
system, or computer network, 






2015 Reg. Sess.) 
Minnesota 5 
“[A]ny communication made 







2015 1st Spec. 
Sess.) 






Missouri 2 “[C]ommunication by any means” 
MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 565.225 (West, 
Westlaw through 
2015 1st Reg. 
Sess.) 
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through July 2015 
Sess.) 
Nebraska 1 N/A N/A 
Nevada 5 
“[U]se of an Internet or 
network site, electronic mail, 
text messaging or any other 
similar means of 
communication . . . .” 







“[I]mpart a message by any 
method of transmission, 
including but not limited to 
telephoning or personally 
delivering or sending or 
having delivered any 
information or material by 
written or printed note or 
letter, package, mail, courier 
service or electronic 
transmission, including 
electronic transmissions 
generated or communicated 
via a computer.” 
N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 644:4 
(West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.) 
New Jersey 1 N/A N/A 
New Mexico 1 N/A N/A 
New York 1 N/A N/A 
North Carolina 4 
“Any transfer of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, 
or intelligence of any nature, 
transmitted in whole or in part 
by a wire, radio, computer, 
electromagnetic, 
photoelectric, or photo-optical 
system.” 
N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14-196.3 (2013) 
North Dakota 2 
“Communicates in writing or 
by electronic communication 
a threat . . . .” 
N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-17-07 
(LEXIS through 
2015 Reg. Legis. 
Sess.) 
94 N.C. L. REV. 105 (2015) 
2015] COMMUNICATION IN CYBERSPACE 157 
 
Jurisdiction Category Communication Language Citation 
Ohio 4 
“[A]ny electronic method of 
remotely transferring 
information, including, but 
not limited to, any computer, 
computer network, computer 








“[A]ny type of telephonic, 
electronic or radio 
communications, or 
transmission of signs, signals, 
data, writings, images and 
sounds or intelligence of any 
nature by telephone, including 
cellular telephones, wire, 
cable, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photo-
optical system or the creation, 
display, management, storage, 
processing, transmission or 
distribution of images, text, 
voice, video or data by wire, 
cable or wireless means, 
including the Internet.” 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 
21, § 1172 (West, 
Westlaw through 
2015 1st Reg. 
Sess.) 
Oregon 4 
“[E]lectronic mail, the 
Internet, a telephone text 
message or any other 
transmission of information 
by wire, radio, optical cable, 
cellular system, 
electromagnetic system or 
other similar means.” 






“[E]lectronic means, including 
telephone, electronic mail, 
Internet, facsimile, telex, 
wireless communication or 
similar transmission” 
18 PA. STAT. 





Rhode Island 2 
“[Electronic] communication 
by computer or other 
electronic device” 
11 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 11-52-4.2 
(LEXIS through 
Jan. 2015 Sess.) 
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Jurisdiction Category Communication Language Citation 
South Carolina 5 
“[A]ny transfer of signs, 
signals, writings, images, 
sounds, data, intelligence, or 
information of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part 
by any device, system, or 
mechanism including, but not 
limited to, a wire, radio, 
computer, electromagnetic, 
photoelectric, or photo-optical 
system.” 
S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-3-1700 
(Supp. 2014) 
South Dakota 2 
“[A]ny verbal, electronic, 
digital media, mechanical, 








“[I]ncluding, but not limited 
to, text messaging, facsimile 
transmissions, electronic mail 





“[T]ransfer of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, 
or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part 











“[U]ses a computer, the 
Internet, text messaging, or 
any other electronic means to 
commit an act that is a part of 






Vermont 2 “[T]elephone calls or other electronic communications” 
VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13, § 1027 
(LEXIS through 
2015 Reg. Sess.)  
Virginia 2 
“[U]se a computer or 
computer network to 
communicate . . . .” 
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Jurisdiction Category Communication Language Citation 







West Virginia 3 
“[D]elivered or transmitted to 
a specific person . . . .” 






“[A]ny transfer of signs, 
signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data or intelligence of 
any nature, or any transfer of 






anonymously or otherwise, or 
causing a communication with 
another person by verbal, 
electronic, mechanical, 
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